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A. German Law 
This part of our joint research paper will deal with executive compensation in Germany. It 
will put light on the questions of the levels, the structure and the regulation of executive com-
pensation in Germany. 
I. Introduction 
Executive compensation is a topic that is always present. Not only is it present in the media 
but also is it present in the legal science as a big part of corporate governance.  
This paper will deal with executive compensation in Germany on different levels. First of all 
this paper will describe the development of executive compensation in Germany, then turn to 
the structure and the levels of executive compensation and in the end focus on the legal 
framework of executive compensation. In order of relevance this paper will concentrate on 
executive compensation in stock corporations since stock corporations are not only a German 
phenomenon. What this paper tries to outline are the different acting parties when it comes to 
executive compensation and what their interests are. It will be examined if they all do have 
the same interests and what the government’s role in this area is. The last part of the paper 
will deal with the European Unions involvement in the field of executive compensation. What 
are the planning, did they suppose anything and if yes does this correlate with the common 
German system?  
II. Development of Executive Compensation in Germany 
To have a better understanding of the current situation of executive compensation it is neces-
sary to have a look at how this has developed throughout the years. Maybe there are turning 
points, such as the financial crisis in 2008 that have led to a change in the remuneration of 
executives in Germany.  
When having a look at the remuneration of an average CEO in Germany one can see that be-
tween 1997 and 2005 its remuneration has been growing by 8.6 per cent.1. But this growth 
does not continue endlessly. In 2008 the financial crisis hits the world and this also effects the 
remuneration of executives. The following numbers concern executives from big German 
Corporations, which are either, listed in the German Stock Index (DAX) or the Mid-Cap 
																																																								
1	Geiler,Renneboog in: Anderson/Baker (eds.), Corporate Governance, 263-83. 
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Stock Index (MDAX).2 In the year of the financial crisis in 2008 and in 2009 the average re-
muneration of an executive was 17 per cent lower than in 2006 before the crisis.3. But these 
numbers need to be examined differently since the remuneration of executives consists of 
several different parts. The average remuneration, which decreased rapidly throughout the 
financial crisis, was heavily affected by the decreasing of the bonuses. The average bonus 
decreased in 2008 compared to 2006 about 31,3 percent. In 2009 this is only 29,5 percent but 
still a lot less than before the financial crisis.4 The fixed part of the income, which is com-
pared to the bonuses, not depending on performance of the stock value or anything else even 
had a growth from 2006 to 2009 of about 8 per cent.5  What else can be found when looking 
at the numbers is that in 2011 the levels of executive compensation had risen so far that they 
have surpassed their 2007 levels.6  
So one can see that executive compensation has undergone some changes in the latest history. 
After a steady growth it came to an end during the financial crisis, especially because the per-
formance based parts of the remuneration packages decreased heavily but they recovered 
again and are now even higher than before the financial crisis.  
III. Structure and Levels of Executive Compensation 
A remuneration package for an executive is a very complex matter because it does not only 
consist of a fixed sum, which is paid out monthly. Such a package can be split into two parts, 
the fixed and the variable part.7  
1. Fixed part of Executive compensation  
The fixed part of the income is easy to explain. It mostly consists of a fixed base salary, 
which gets paid out monthly to the executive.8 In addition to the fixed salary there can also be 
smaller payments made to the executive that count into the fixed part such as subsidies for 
rent or insurances.9 One big benefit of a fixed base salary is that it is easy to understand who 
gets paid how much.10 This can be of a special interest for the shareholders of a company.  
																																																								
2	Döscher, Stand und Entwicklung der Vorstandsvergütung, 118, 2014. 
3	Döscher, Stand und Entwicklung der Vorstandsvergütung, 121,2014.  
4	Döscher, Stand und Entwicklung der Vorstandsvergütung, 121, 2014.  
5	Döscher, Stand und Entwicklung der Vorstandsvergütung, 121, 2014. 
6 Thomas/Van der Elst ,  14-10 Vanderbilt L. and E. Research Paper, 655, 691 (2014). 
7 Langenbucher, Aktien und Kapitalmarktrecht,  39 (§4 Nr.32).  
8 Döscher ,  Stand und Entwicklung der Vorstandsvergütung, 14 ,2014. 
9 Döscher ,  Stand und Entwicklung der Vorstandsvergütung, 13, 2014. 
10 Pape, Vergütungs- und Abfindungszahlungen an Vorstandsmitglieder, 67, 2004. 
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But since the influence of the fixed part of the remuneration packages is decreasing through-
out the years the focus needs to be laid on the variable part and why companies do grant it.11  
2. Variable part of Executive compensation 
The first question that needs to be put up is what can be count to the variable part of a remu-
neration package. The variable part of executive compensation has one characteristic, which 
can always be found when talking about them. Variable pay is always performance related. 12 
In the contract of an executive it usually says that there will be a variable pay but that the 
amount will be depending on various criteria. The only thing that differs is on which criteria 
this performance is measured and what effect these payments are supposed to have. 
a) Short-term incentives 
One sort of payment that can be found in almost every company is an annual bonus which is 
related to the companies accounting or stock performance of the last business year.13  Despite 
the annual bonus a golden handshake, a bonus when the executive leaves the company, or a 
bonus for a good merger do also count as short-term payments.14 Such remuneration can be 
described as a short-term incentive for executives.15 It is called a short-term incentive because 
it gives the executive an incentive to do everything to achieve higher results, either account-
ing results or stock performance in a short time.  Usually companies set forward an annual 
goal and if the executive accomplishes his goal he will get rewarded with a bonus. That is the 
way short-term incentives work.  
b) Long-term incentives 
Despite annual bonuses related to stock performance there are also several other ways to use 
the stock development in remuneration packages. The most common way to use the stock 
development as a long-term incentive is to pay the executive in stock options.16 This means 
that the executive receives the right to buy a certain amount of the companies stock for a fixed 
price.17 But stock options are due to some regulation if they are going to be used as a long-
term behavioral control. It is not possible to cash these stock options immediately, they need 
																																																								
11 Pape ,  Vergütungs-und Abfindungszahlungen an Vorstandsmitglieder, 18 ,  2004. 
12	Döscher, Stand und Entwicklung der Vorstandsvergütung, 13, 2014. 
13 Murphy, in: Ashenfelter/Card (eds.), Executive Compensation, 2486, 2498. 
14 Arnold/Günther, Handbuch Börsennotierte AG, §20 Rn.40.  
15 Döscher, Stand und Entwicklung der Vorstandsvergütung, 16, 2014. 
16 Pape, Vergütungs- und Abfindungszahlungen an Vorstandsmitglieder, 70, 2004. 
17	Pape, Vergütungs- und Abfindungszahlungen an Vorstandsmitglieder, 71, 2004. 
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to be held for four years due to §193 para.2 no. 4 Aktiengesetz (in following referred to as 
AktG)18. This long holding period carries out the main will of the legislator, which is to build 
up a remuneration structure, which is focused on the sustainable long-term development of 
the company.19 Another regulation for stock options is that after a ruling of the Federal Civil 
Court of Justice in 2004 they are only allowed in the remuneration packages of executive 
board members.20 The court stated that it is not the will of the legislator that the supervisory 
board is subject to the same behavioral control mechanism than the executive board is be-
cause this would jeopardize the system of management board and supervisory board.21 
c) Alignment of interests 
As described above the different sorts of variable pay are used as an instrument for behavioral 
control of executives. To have a better understand who is having interests in those behavioral  
 control actions it is necessary to point out the different parties acting in a stock corporation.  
On the one hand there are the owners of a company, the shareholders. On the other hand there 
are the executives, who are sitting in the board of executives and are in charge of managing 
the company by themselves.22  
aa) Principal-agent theory 
In the following shareholders are referred to as principals and executives are referred to as 
agents. The principal-agent theory has been developed in the field of economics but has great 
influence on modern day corporate governance.23 
With a greater diversification of ownership in a stock corporation it gets more and more diffi-
cult for the principals to supervise what the agents are doing.24 Whenever a task is delegated 
from a principal to an agent this creates an imbalance of information. So having a stock cor-
poration in mind this means that the agents are in a superior possession of information com-
pared to the principals.25 The principal-agent theory is now saying that the agents do not act in 
the interests of the principals but rather in favor of their own best interest.26 The closest solu-
tion would be to start with the implementation of monitoring structures. This idea comes to an 
																																																								
18 German Stock Corporation Act.  
19 Langenbucher, Aktien-und Kapitalmarktrecht, 38 (§4 Nr.30a). 
20 Unknown, 2004 NJW, 1109, 1009. 
21	Unknown, 2004 NJW, 1109, 1009 .  
22 Langenbucher, Aktien und Kapitalmarktrecht, 38 (§4 Nr.1).  
23 Langenbucher, Aktien und Kapitalmarktrecht, §1 Nr.16-21. 
24 Pape, Vergütungs- und Abfindungszahlungen an Vorstandsmitglieder, 63, 2004. 
25 Langenbucher, Aktien und Kapitalmarktrecht, §1 Nr.17. 
26 Pape, Vergütungs- und Abfindungszahlungen an Vorstandsmitglieder, 63, 2004. 
	 5	
end with the fact that such monitoring structures would cost a lot of money and not necessari-
ly provide any improvement for the principals.27 In fact in Germany there is a monitoring sys-
tem implemented by the AktG. §111 para. 1 AktG states that it is the task of the supervisory 
board to monitor the executives of a stock corporation. The supervisory board is elected by 
the shareholders general assembly. But besides the monitoring throughout the supervisory 
board principals do also use remuneration packages to overcome the above-described prob-
lem.28 So the principals try to align the interests of themselves and the agents by using the 
different types of remuneration packages. 
Especially long-term incentive orientated remuneration packages such as stock options have 
been considered an appropriate way to overcome these principal-agent problems.29 But also 
this way of paying agents does open a lot of loopholes that might not be in the best interest of 
the principals. For example if the stock options are only connected to the overall development 
of the stock and not to the development of the stock compared to other competitors from the 
same industry.30 So stock options would need to be a highly complex matter to overcome the-
se principal-agent problems. In practice a few German Dax-listed companies have come up 
with another way of using stocks to create incentives for behavior which is favorable for the 
principals. They force their agents to hold a certain amount of the companies stock, which 
might in some cases be worth up to 300 per cent of the annual salary of the agent.31  
Short-term incentives do not seem to be to optimal solution for the problem as well. They 
may lead to short term results that are very favorable for the principals but an executive only 
paid with those might not want to focus on a long-term development of the company. In addi-
tion to this problem a payment with just short-term incentives is restricted in §87 para. 1 S. 3 
AktG. It says that the remuneration structure needs to be focused on a sustainable long-term 
development of the stock corporation. 
What comes into mind when having a look at the positive and negative effects of the above 
described variations of executive pay is a mix that contains all of these parts.  
																																																								
27 Langenbucher, Aktien und Kapitalmarktrecht, §1 Nr.23. 
28 Langenbucher, Aktien und Kapitalmarktrecht, §1 Nr.21. 
29 Langenbucher, Aktien und Kapitalmarktrecht, § 1 Nr. 27.  
30 Langenbucher, Aktien und Kapitalmarktrecht, §1 Nr.28.  
31 Haar, in: Randall/Hill (eds.) Executive Compensation under German corporate law, 486, 
496. 
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bb) Managerial power theory 
This theory is based on the thought that executive compensation is not only a way to over-
come the agency problems described above but also as part of the agency problems itself.32 
The theory is based on the believe that that the pay for executives will be higher when they 
are more powerful.33  
According to this theory one very relevant fact in the process of setting up a remuneration 
package is how relevant outsiders will perceive this package, especially the amount of rent 
that the executive is able to extract. 34 The group of relevant outsiders that may criticize the 
remuneration package can either be the media of parts of the shareholders itself.35 There is 
empirical evidence for this theory stating that CEO´s of big companies who have been target 
of such outrage had their remuneration package reduced in the following years.36  As a conse-
quence to this the theory states that executives to invest a lot into camouflage of their remu-
neration agreements and so the matter of transparency and disclosure is becoming more and 
more important.37 According to the managerial power theory this whole outrage effect leads 
to the point that powerful executives do find other ways to get themselves high remuneration 
packages without causing an outcry, such as borrowing money to their executives at interest 
rates that are way below market level.38   
In Germany stock corporations are being forced by the Gesetz über die Offenlegung von Vor-
standsvergütungen39 (in following referred to as VorstOG) to disclose the remuneration pack-
ages individually in the companies’ annual report.40 This shows that the legislator is somehow 
trying to fight the power of the executives by forcing to disclose material. Even though it is 
not the interest of the legislator to actively steping into the decision process of designing a 
executive remuneration package. 
cc) Conclusion 
To conclude the two theories described above for the case of executive compensation in Ger-
many it seems like there is a mix out of both. On the one side principals are trying to over-
																																																								
32 Bebchuck/Fried, 9813 NBER Working Paper Series,1, 1 (2003).  
33 Bebchuck/Fried, 9813 NBER Working Paper Series,1, 9 (2003).  
34 Bebchuck/Fried, 9813 NBER Working Paper Series,1 5 (2003). 
35 Bebchuck/Fried, 9813 NBER Working Paper Series,1, 5 (2003). 
36 Bebchuck/Fried, 9813 NBER Working Paper Series,1, 5 (2003). ;  Thomas/Martin, The effect 
of shareholder proposals on executive compensation, 1999, 1021. 
37 Bebchuck/Fried, 9813 NBER Working Paper Series,1, 6 (2003) 
38 Bebchuck/Fried, 9813 NBER Working Paper Series,1, 10, 13 (2003).  
39 Law about the disclosure of executive compensation as of August 5,2005, BGB1. I 2005, 
P.2267. 
40 Aktiengesetz Kommentar Seibt ,  §87 Nr.24-26 (2015).  
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come the agency problems but on the other hand the height and the structure of the compensa-
tion can be a problem itself.  
IV Legal framework of executive compensation 
After having a look at the development of executive compensation and its different levels it is 
now time to have a look at the legal framework of it. In order to understand the following 
explanations it is important that Germany in contrary to the US has a legal system that is code 
based and not case law based.  
1.  Rules and regulations  
The primary source of rules and regulations concerning stock corporations in Germany is the 
Aktiengesetz. It applies to every stock corporation that is established under the laws of Ger-
many.41 Due to the fact that the Aktiengesetz applies to every stock corporation established 
under the laws of Germany it also regulates matters concerning Corporate Governance, espe-
cially the topic of executive compensation. The Aktiengesetz provides a section concerning 
remuneration packages for executives.  This section will be subject of the next paragraph.  
Besides the Aktiengesetz there is also another source of regulations and rules concerning 
good Corporate Governance for stock corporations in Germany. This other source is the 
Deutsche Corporate Governance Kodex42 (in following referred to as DCGK). The DCGK is 
the result of a commission that the Germany government has set up in 2000 to identify the 
weaknesses existing in German leadership and control system.43 In opposite to the Aktieng-
esetz the DCGK is only applying for German stock corporations that are listed.44 Another 
opposite to the Aktiengesetz is that its rules are technically not binding rules, so the compa-
nies do not have to obtain them.45 Never the less it would be better for stock corporations to 
obtain these rules because due to §166 para. 1 AktG they have to explain annually to which 
extend they comply with the rules of the DCGK and if not why there is a non-compliance. So 
even if the DCGK is non binding it has quite a big regulatory effect for publicly traded stock 
corporations. This rule can be dated back to a main idea that the founders of the DCGK had 
which is that corporations should not be forced into inflexible rules but on the other hand 
																																																								
41 Hausemann/Bechtolh-Ort, 2010 11(2) E.B.O.R, 195, 205 (2010) .  
42 German Corporate Governance Codex. 
43 Mathieu,38 Brook. J.Int’l L., 580, 606 (2013). 
44  Hausemann/Bechtolh-Ort2010 11(2) E.B.O.R, 195, 205 (2010) .  
45 Mathieu,38 Brook. J.Int’l L., 580, 607 (2013).  
	 8	
could be possibly facing some uproar by their shareholders in case of non-compliance.46 The 
only problem that comes along with this assumption is that it assumes that there are share-
holders who are informed about the different rules and provisions of the Code. If this is not 
the case then the whole system of comply-or-explain is worthless.  
2. Developing a remuneration package 
The development process of a remuneration package has changed in the last years. Before the 
Gesetz zur Angemessenheit der Vorstandsvergütung47 (in following referred to as VorstAG) 
was passed, it was common practice that the supervisory board would delegate the task of 
developing and deciding about a new remuneration system to a committee that they have 
founded.48 Now §107 para.3 S. 3 AktG states that the supervisory board has to decide about 
such topics itself. They do not need to figure out every aspect in the supervisory board but 
they do have to take the final decision by themselves.49 
Shareholders do not play a role when it comes to the development of remuneration packages. 
The only time shareholders participate in the process of granting a remuneration package is 
when they need to vote on a stock option plan for executives at the general assembly.50 Nev-
ertheless this shareholders vote should not be understood as a possibility for shareholders to 
participate in the developing process of a remuneration package, its reason can be found in the 
financial constitution of a stock corporation when it comes to the topic of buying stocks.51 
a). Benchmarks for remuneration packages 
The Aktiengesetz states several benchmarks for executive compensation that need to be ob-
tained by the supervisory board. The first benchmark for developing a remuneration package 
for executives is set up in §87 para.1 S.1 AktG. This provision states that the remuneration 
needs to be in order with the performance and the tasks of the executive it is designed for as 
well as well as it needs to be in good balance with the situation of the corporation and should 
not exceed usual remuneration.  Measuring the remuneration with the performance of the ex-
ecutive is highly relevant when it comes to variable components.52 Usual remuneration means 
for the supervisory board that they need to measure their remuneration decision in two differ-
																																																								
46 Mathieu,38 Brook. J.Int’l L., 580, 607 (2013).  
47 47 Law on the appropriateness of director compensation as of July 31 2009, BGB1, 50 2005, 
p. 2509. 
48 Handbuch Börsennotierte AG Arnold/Günther, §20, 910, p. 919-920 (2014). 
49 Handbuch Börsennotierte AG Arnold/Günther ,  §20 910, p. 920 (2014).  
50 Langenbucher, Aktien- und Kapitalmarktrecht ,  36 (§ 4, Nr.26) .  
51 Langenbucher, Aktien- und Kapitalmarktrecht, 36 (§ 4, Nr.26). 
52 Handbuch Börsennotierte AG Arnold/Günther ,  §20, 910, 922 (2014).  
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ent factors. First of all they need to identify the usual remuneration in their field of industry in 
Germany and then figure out the overall usual remuneration for executives in Germany.53 In a 
second step the usual remuneration for executives also needs to be orientated on the usual 
remuneration for average workers in their company.54 So the element of pay ratio is included 
into the provisions of the Aktiengesetz, even though there are no concrete numbers which pay 
ratio should be unusual. In consequence the supervisory board still has a big discretionary 
power. As well according to §87 para. 1 the supervisory board is allowed to distinguish from 
the CEO and another executive, what usually results in a way higher remuneration for CEOs 
that for other executives.  
The second benchmark can be found in §87 para.1 S.2 AktG. This provision states that execu-
tive remuneration in listed stock corporations needs to be orientated upon the sustainable de-
velopment of the company. The question arising from that is if short-term incentives are now 
not allowed anymore. According to legislation material this provision does not exclude short-
term incentives from executive remuneration in total55, they can still be used in a mixed re-
muneration package as long as they are having a long-term basis56. How many years are sup-
posed to serve as a basis for the long-term assessment of the remuneration is disputed since it 
is not laid down in the Aktiengesetz. In the literature a time span between two or three years 
is being suggested for that.57 A long-term assessment basis also requires for the executive 
remuneration to be related to the state of the company.58 This means that the remuneration 
needs to be in anyhow related to the development of the company, so if the company develops 
badly the remuneration needs to decrease. A claw back mechanism could be a possible way of 
integrating negative developments of the company into remuneration.59 
According to §87 para.1 S. 3 the supervisory board is supposed to install a cap for overall 
positive unusual developments. This means that the executive is not supposed to fully partici-
pate in these unusually positive developments, which are resulting from a good merger or 
anything like this in a way of high bonuses.60 The way this cap is supposed to look like is up 
to the supervisory board61, no further information on that can be found in the law. 
																																																								
53 Handbuch Börsennotierte AG Arnold/Günther ,  §20, 910, 923 (2014); Fleischer ,  2009 NZG, 
801, 802 (2009).  
54 Handbuch Börsennotierte AG Arnold/Günther ,  §20, 910, 923 (2014).  
55 Bundestagsdrucksachen, 16/13443, p.16. 
56 Deilmann/Otte, 2009 GWR, 261, 261 (2009).  
57 Deilmann/Otte, 2009 GWR, 261, 262 (2009); Seibt, AktG-Kommentar Volume 1, 1332, 1341 
Nr. 12 (2015). 
58 Handbuch Börsennotierte AG Arnold/Günther ,  §20, 910, 927 (2014).  
59 Aktiengesetz Kommentar Seibt ,  1332, 1341 Nr. 12a (2015).  
60 Handbuch Börsennotierte AG Arnold/Günther ,  §20, 910, 928 (2014).  
61 Deilmann/Otte, 2009 GWR, 261, 263 (2009). 
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b). Legal consequences arising from inappropriate remuneration 
As we can see above there are several benchmarks that need to be considered when a new 
remuneration package is being developed. But are there any consequences arising from a re-
muneration package that is not within the outlines laid out in the Aktiengesetz? For an execu-
tive who receives a remuneration package that is not within these outlines this has, according 
to the superior legal opinion no effect for him personally.62 He can still demand his remunera-
tion to be paid out and does not have to fear that the company demands it back. The stock 
corporation for exceeding the outlines laid out in the Aktiengesetz can take the supervisory 
board into liability.63 The corporation may demand compensation from the supervisory board 
according to §116 S.3 AktG.  
 3. Say on pay in Germany 
What is say on pay? Say on pay means that the shareholders of a stock corporation are being 
asked to vote about the remuneration for their executives. The following will describe how 
say on pay in Germany developed and what it means for stock corporations in Germany.  
a). Applicability  
Say on pay was first established in German corporate law in 2009 when the parliament passed 
the VorstAG. Now the Aktiengesetz provides in §120 para. 4 that listed stock corporations 
can have their general assembly of shareholders vote on the system of executive compensa-
tion. The vote of the general assembly is only an advisory vote. According to legislation ma-
terial the vote is not meant to be a recurring event, which is supposed to take place on an an-
nual basis. §120 para. 4 S.2 AktG states that the vote is of a non-legally binding character and 
therefore has no direct influence on the system of executive remuneration. Even though the 
vote is of a non-legally binding character the lawmaker thinks that say on pay works the way 
it is supposed to do. For them the key factor of the whole system is the pressure that is being 
build up in connection with a negative vote and the media coverage about it.64 Some scholars 
even believe that the executive remuneration system does not have to suffer a defeat at the 
general assembly, dissenting votes of about 20% will be enough to have the supervisory board 
adjust the remuneration system.65  
																																																								
62	Aktiengesetz Kommentar  Seibt, §87  Nr .  17 (2015). 
63 Handbuch Börsennotierte AG Arnold/Günther ,  §20, 910, 929 (2014).  
64 Vesper-Gräske, 14 German Law Journal, 749 (2013).  
65 Vesper-Gräske, 14 German Law Journal, 749 (2013).  
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In theory this means that if the shareholders are able to create a certain amount of media cov-
erage of the whole event they might be able to have the supervisory board rethink its decision. 
This would be revolutionary when just thinking about its effect. 
b). Say on pay in practice 
What needs to be examined now is if the lawmaker and the scholars were right with their the-
ories or if in reality the supervisory board is to powerful to be challenged by a group of share-
holders. When having a look at the 30 biggest German companies listed in the DAX one can 
see that they all had their shareholders vote on their system of executive remuneration since 
2010.66 At the MDAX the situation is a little bit different. It seems like that the smaller the 
companies are, the less they want to get their remuneration system be up on vote. Only 78% 
of the companies that are listed in the MDAX had their general assemblies to vote on the re-
muneration system, the numbers do even decrease when turning to companies that are not 
listed in the MDAX anymore. 67 The point that the say on pay vote is not meant to be a recur-
ring event can also be seen in the numbers. Since 2010 the number of companies that submit-
ted their remuneration system for vote dropped heavily. In 2011 only 14 out of 30 had submit-
ted their systems for vote, these 14 mainly consisted of companies that did not vote in 2010.68 
So the number of companies that had their shareholders vote for more than one time is far 
away from 30 out of 30, in fact it is 3 out of 30 that allowed their shareholders to vote annual-
ly69 . 
Most of the companies did not face any opposition from their shareholders. But there are a 
few examples where the shareholders did not approve the remuneration system or the compa-
ny had to face a serious number of dissenting votes. The only company that had its remunera-
tion system denied was Heidelberger  Cement in 201070, the shareholders denied a remunera-
tion system that would grant would grant the executives a remuneration of 8.6 million € in 
2008 to develop up to 16 million € in 200971. After the rejection Heidelberger Cement devel-
oped a new remuneration system and submitted it up for vote in 2011, over 96% of the share-
holders approved it now.72 Even though the remuneration system of Deutsche Bank was not 
refused in 2010 it is of great interest. At the general assembly in 2010 the remuneration sys-
																																																								
66 Thomas/Van-der-Elst, 14-10 Law and Economics Working paper, 655, 692 (2014). 
67 Thomas/Van-der-Elst, 14-10 Law and Economics Working paper, 655, 692 (2014).  
68 Vesper-Gräske, 14 German Law Journal, 749 (2013).  
69 Vesper-Gräske, 14 German Law Journal, 749 (2013).  
70 Thomas/Van-der-Elst, 14-10 Law and Economics Working paper, 655, 692 (2014).  
71 Vesper-Gräske, 14 German Law Journal, 749 (2013).  
72 Thomas/Van-der-Elst, 14-10 Law and Economics Working paper, 655, 693 (2014).  
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tem submitted by Deutsche Bank faced a number of dissenting votes of 42%.73 As a result 
their resubmitted their remuneration system in 2012, even though they only made minor 
changes to it but tried to keep it more transparent itself, they received an approval rate of 
92%.74 
c). Conclusion 
To conclude the topic of say on pay in Germany two things can be said. First of all even 
though say on pay is not mandatory for listed companies, a great majority of them had sub-
mitted their systems for vote, at least once since 2010. The second point that can be seen is 
that the influence of shareholders is relatively modest. Of course the companies that have ex-
perienced pressure from the shareholders changed their systems, but the changes that have 
been made were relatively small and did not overthrow the whole remuneration system. One 
result of the whole new say on pay system that the media has figured out, is that companies 
are having more deliberations with their biggest institutional investors such as Banks or Funds 
to figure out remuneration systems for executives that they are willing to approve at the gen-
eral assembly.75 This is due to the German stock market where institutional investors are in 
control of a lot of companies. 
In 2012 the German government proposed another amendment to the Aktiengesetz that would 
have made annually say on pay votes mandatory and legally binding.76 This proposal never 
went into law.  
4. European Union and executive compensation 
Since the European Union (in following referred to as EU) is taking an active role in a lot of 
areas of the law it needs to be outlined if they are as well active in the filed of corporate Gov-
ernance, especially executive compensation. In the field of business law the EU is not actually 
issuing binding laws for the member states, they approach this topic by issuing recommenda-
tions.77 Recommendations are legally not binding for the member states78, so the member 
states can follow them or not.  
In 2004 the Commission of the European Union (in following referred to as EC) published a 
recommendation on appropriate remuneration regimes for executives of listed stock corpora-
																																																								
73 Thomas/Van-der-Elst, 14-10 Law and Economics Working paper, 655, 692 (2014).  
74 Thomas/Van-der-Elst, 14-10 Law and Economics Working paper, 655, 693. (2014).  
75 Johson, Financial Times, January 27, at para. 6 (2013).  
76 Ziemons, 2013 GWR, 283, 284-285 (2013).  
77 Vesper-Gräske, 14 German Law Journal, 749,751 (2013).  
78 Das Recht der EU  Nettesheim ,  Art. 288 Nr.200 (2015). 
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tions79. The recommendation consists of various parts concerning executive compensation. 
The recommendation states, that every listed stock corporation should provide its sharehold-
ers with an individualized report concerning the remuneration system. According to the EC 
this report should explain why the different parts of the remuneration package where chosen 
and on which kind of information they are calculated upon.80 As well did the EC recommend 
that the shareholders should vote upon the remuneration system at the annual general assem-
bly.81 In the aftermath of the financial crisis the EC released a second recommendation, which 
is supposed to complement the recommendation of 2004.82 The main point of this new rec-
ommendation is to make sure the structure of executive compensation is orientated upon a 
long-term sustainable development of the corporation.83 As well included in the recommenda-
tion is that the EC supports the establishment of clawback mechanism to reclaim parts of var-
iable pay in case of failure.84  
The latest actions of the Commission regarding executive compensation took place in 2014 
when the EC published the proposal of a EU directive concerning the rights of shareholders.85 
The EU directive would make it mandatory for companies to put their remuneration policy up 
for vote every three years at the general assembly, the vote would as well be legally binding.86 
Stock corporations would also need to state how the pay ratio in the company is and how it 
influenced executive remuneration.87 This would be a huge step of EU interference into busi-
ness law of the states.  
A lot of points that the EC suggested in their recommendations are already put into law in 
Germany. Especially the suggestions about disclosure of executive compensation, provisions 
concerning this topic can already be found in the Aktiengesetz. What is not put into law in the 
intensity that the EU might wish for it is the regulation about say on pay. Even though Ger-
man stock corporations can put their remuneration for executive up for vote at the general 
assembly this is not legally binding at all.  
																																																								
79 Recommendation 2004/913/EC of the Commission of December 14 2004, O. J. Of the EU Nr. 
L385, p. 55. 
80 Vesper-Gräske, 14 German Law Journal, 749,751 (2013).  
81 Vesper-Gräske, 14 German Law Journal, 749,751 (2013).  
82 Commission Recommendation C(2009) 3177 as of April 30 2009 complementing recommen-
dation 2004/913/EC.  
83 Vesper-Gräske, 14 German Law Journal, 749,751 (2013).  
84 Hausemann/Bechtold-Orb, 2010 11(2) E.B.O.R, 195, 198 (2010). 
85 Proposal 2014/0121 for the change of EU directive 2007/36/EG as of July 11 2007, O. J of 
the EU Nr. L184, p.17. 
86 Mense, 2014 GWR, 232, 235 (2014). 
87 Mense, 2014 GWR, 232, 235 (2014). 
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V. Conclusion 
To conclude this paper about executive compensation in Germany there are several things that 
can be said. First of all executive compensation is a very complex matter where several dif-
ferent parties do play a role. Every different acting party, such as the shareholder, the execu-
tives themselves and the supervisory board has their own interest when it comes down to de-
signing such a remuneration package. The biggest interests can be split up into two groups. 
On the one side there are the shareholders whose interest it is to maximize their own wealth, 
which goes hand in hand with a maximization of the wealth of the company. On the other 
hand there are the executives who might not always bee that interested in the long-term de-
velopment of the company since they do not hold any shares of it. Executive compensation is 
being used to align the interest of all the acting parties. In order to do so especially incentive 
orientated compensation plays an important role.  
At this point the lawmaker comes into play with the legal framework for executive compensa-
tion. Its main idea behind all the rules and regulations concerning executive compensation in 
Germany is to protect interests of the shareholders. Especially in the aftermath of the financial 
crisis in 2008 when incentive orientated compensation was at its peak the lawmaker became 
active. A set of different laws was passed with the aim to grant shareholders a better protec-
tion. The requirement of a sustainable basis for executive remuneration is maybe the biggest 
point that developed out of this process in the aftermath of 2008. In the past years the Europe-
an Union became more and more active in the field of executive compensation as well. Until 
today the European Commission has passed two proposals concerning executive compensa-
tion and a first draft of a EU directive. All these proposals and drafts consist in most parts of 
things that are already turned into law in Germany by some degree. Even though the proposed 
provisions about say on pay and disclosure are stricter than the German provisions about the-
se topics.  
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B. US part 
Introduction 
 
This section, of the work on Executive Compensation, a comparative approach between Ger-
many and US, deals with a very general view over executive compensation in the US from a 
corporate governance perspective. The purpose is to analyze executive compensation, its pur-
poses and the way the US legislative as well as the market has approached the topic in order 
to align and discipline compensation practices that depart from shareholder value creation. 
Misaligned incentives, between shareholders as principals and executives as agents, have cre-
ated a so-called agency problem in the managers’ compensation decision process.88  
 
The goal of this paper is to answer the following questions: Should the US federal govern-
ment intervene and regulate executive compensation? Is or has government disclosure and 
disclosure refinement approach over executive compensation been the right way of interven-
tion and what is the impact of those measures over the society, the market, shareholders and 
the press? Are disclosure and independence requirements enough?  
 
In order to answer the questions, we will analyze a broad range of factors that under a corpo-
rate governance perspective have shaped executive compensation. In Chapter I, we will go 
through the history and development of executive compensation in the US and the legal ap-
proach of the federal government. In Chapter II we discuss the way executive compensation is 
structured and its authorization process. In Chapter III, we work on the levels and the rela-
tionship between power and pay, as well as the economic determinants and the forms and 
reward types that are applicable to managers pay packages. Finally, in Chapter IV, we analyze 
the legal framework governing executive compensation in the US, considering the federal 
government approach and the states courts one. We also discuss the latest reforms and their 
effects. At the end we conclude that, despite the assertiveness of US disclosure and independ-
ence approach, there are still some risks and challenges to take into account in order to 
properly frame executive compensation, an agency problem that is in a continuous evolution. 
  
																																																								
88	See	Lucian	Bebchuk	and	Jesse	Fried.	Pay	without	Performance	–	The	unfulfilled	promise	of	Executive	Compensation	
at	16	
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I. Historical Development of Executive Compensation 
• USA 
 
Generally, the historical development of executive compensation, has been carried out or 
driven either by the public or by federal action. It is important to realize that executive com-
pensation was not an issue until the early twentieth century when large corporations began to 
dominate the economy. 89 The corporation’s growth required investment from many sources. 
Hence, as a result of the shareholder dispersion, company’s original owners could not control 
company’s management any longer.90 Moreover, owner-managers had the authority and con-
trol over executive compensation, forthwith over their own pay. In contrast, non-owner ex-
ecutives had to negotiate their compensation – agency problem relationship. 91 As a result, by 
the 1930s, retail shareholding was already a large-scale phenomenon, which provided politi-
cal support for the New Deal legislation. This legislation was designed around the dispersed 
stock ownership of the Berle-Means modern corporation, thus making it viable.92 Executive 
compensation scheme was changing. During the 1960s the executive compensation rose 
quickly and then slowed during the 1970s. Between 1980 and 1993, executive compensation 
increased dramatically.93 
o Early Stages  
 
The first recorded controversy over executive compensation dates from the 1920s. Bethlehem 
Steel Corporation disclosed that it paid its President, Eugene G. Grace, annual bonuses that 
“reached $1,000,000 to $1,500,000.”94 At the end of the 1920s the economy fall dramatically 
and the US was going through the great depression, as a result during the early 1930’s execu-
tive compensation became a public issue, due to series of disclosures.95 In 1933, after two 
years of litigation, the American Tobacco Company (“ATC”) executive compensation was 
found by the Supreme Court large enough to warrant investigation.96 An ATC shareholder 
brought action, challenging the validity of a bylaw, which authorized payments to executives 
																																																								
89	See	Urska	Velikonja.	Negotiating	Executive	Compensation	in	Lieu	of	Regulation	at	626	
90	Urska	V,	supra	note	ii	at	626	
91	Id.	
92	See	John	Armour	and	Jeffrey	N.	Gordon.	The	Berle-Means	Corporation	in	the	21st	Century	at	2	
93	See	Sean	M.	Donahue.	Executive	Compensation:	The	New	Executive	Compensation	Disclosure	Rules	Do	Not	Result	
In	Complete	Disclosure	at	64	
94	Urska	V,	supra	note	ii	at	626	
95	See	Harwell	Wells.	“No	Man	Can	Be	Worth	$1,000,000	a	Year”:	The	Fight	Over	Executive	Compensation	in	1930s	
America.	(http://lawreview.richmond.edu/?p=1375)	
96	See	Rogers	v.	Hill,	289	U.S.	582,	53	S.	Ct.	731,	77	L.	Ed.	1385,	1933	U.S.	LEXIS	194,	88	A.L.R.	744	(U.S.	1933)	
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in addition with their salaries. US people inconformity during the great depression was cou-
pled with the perception of executives abuse off excessive salaries product of self-dealing.97 
The Bethlehem Steel and American Tobacco revelations, combined no doubt with a Depres-
sion-generated disgust with corporate management, fueled public perceptions that executive 
compensation was both excessive and the product of self-dealing. ATC and other executive 
compensation scandals obtained the spotlight and raised questions of how much corporate 
executives ought to be paid. Franklin D. Roosvelt’s New Deal included the enactment of the 
Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. In those securities acts the 
legislative included disclosure of information to be done in the proxy and registration state-
ments of corporations. 98 By the 1950s, some CEOs were making relatively large salaries, but 
many salaries were still at this stage not exorbitant.99 
o 1970;  
 
In the 1970’s CEO compensation was mostly in the form of salary, thus relatively insensitive 
to performance. Hence, observers noted that CEO pay did not track the typical indicators of 
company performance. CEO’s additionally received discretionary annual bonuses.100 The 
board decided the payment of the CEO and then, the CEO was responsible, directly or indi-
rectly, of the compensation of the other employees.101 Again, the relationship between share-
holder wealth maximization and pay was at this stage low, resulting in an inadequate supervi-
sion of company’s performance. Therefore, CEO’s benefited largely of agency costs.102 In 
1978, the Commission implemented the tabular form disclosure, where all direct and indirect 
compensation required to be revealed to the public.103 
o 1980;  
 
During the 1980’s performance based compensation started slowly to play a role in the press 
and created much debate. 104 As a result of 1978 disclosure requirements, shareholders started 
																																																								
97	Harwell	Wells,	supra	note	viii	
98	Sean	M.	Donahue,	supra	note	vi	at	65	
99	Idem	at	63	
100	See	Allen,	Kraakman	and	Subremanian.	Commentaries	and	Cases	on	the	Law	of	Business	Organizations	at	331	
101	Allen,	Kraakman	and	Subremanian,	supra	note	xiii	at	331	
102	Idem	at	332	
103	See	Jerry	W.	Markham.	A	financial	history	of	the	United	States	from	Enron-Era	Scandals	to	the	Subprime	Crisis,	
Routledge	at	101	
104	See	Donald	P.	Delves.	Stock	Options	and	the	New	Rules	of	Corporate	Accountability:	Measuring,	Managing,	And	
Rewarding	Executive	Performance	19	(2004).	
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expressing their concerns about the determinants of managerial pay.105 Also, some academics 
started discussing that executives were paid “handsomely”27 and about the “excessive” pay-
ment received by the executives versus the normal employer payment.106 The tabular form 
disclosure of 1978 was amended in 1980 and again on 1983, in order to increase transparency 
in the disclosure statements through a narrative approach.107 
o 1990;  
 
Performance-based compensation started is progress in companies’ boards in the early 
1990’s. Stock and Stock options were the primary forms used to link performance and com-
pensation.108 In 1992, an election year, executive compensation was a recurrent topic in de-
bates for both, republicans and democrats. During Bill Clinton’s campaign, he promised to 
tax excessive pay, and he did.109 In 1993, the §162(m) of the Internal Revenue Code was en-
acted, which limited deduction of compensation that exceeded $1 million and that was not a 
performance-based.110 Another common practice in this stage was option repricing – to favor 
CEO’s in option loss of value, the board reset the strike price of the options – thus restoring 
the benefit without providing any incentive. 
 
Additionally, from 1993 to 2000, the amount of executive compensation increased sharply. In 
large companies, such as those representing the S&P 500, average CEO pay increased from 
$3.7 million in 1993 to $17.4 million in 2000.111 This increase happened because of several 
short-term and mostly long-term trends, (i) CEO’s work became stringent because of globali-
zation; (ii) companies inclination of hiring “superstar” CEOs during this time period112; (iii) 
growth in stock options based compensation113; and (iv) the 90’s bull market. Moreover, con-
gress elimination of the corporate income tax deduction for non-incentive-based compensa-
tion in 1993 was also a catalyzer for compensation increase.114 Also, in 1993 the Securities 
Exchange Commission (SEC) adopted amendments to 1983 regulation, to increase the disclo-
sure while categorizing the various elements of compensation and promoting comparability 
																																																								
105	See	Saks	Frydman.	Executive	Compensation:	A	New	View	from	a	Long-Term	Perspective,	1936–2005	at	1	
106	Urska	V,	supra	note	ii	at	627	
107	Jerry	W.	Markham,	supra	note	xvi	at	101	
108	Allen,	Kraakman	and	Subremanian,	supra	note	xiii	at	332	
109	Urska	V,	supra	note	ii	at	627	
110	Allen,	Kraakman	and	Subremanian,	supra	note	xiii	at	334	
111	Sean	M.	Donahue,	supra	note	vi	64	
112	Allen,	Kraakman	and	Subremanian,	supra	note	xiii	at	335	
113	Saks	Frydman,	supra	note	xviii	at	19	
114	See	Roberta	Romano.	Reforming	Executive	Compensation:	Focusing	and	Committing	to	the	Long-term	2009	at	361	
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from year to year and from company to company.115 Furthermore, companies had to disclose 
the annual compensation (i.e. restricted stock awards, option awards), and all other compensa-
tion for the top five executives. Since this decade, congressmen, policymakers, and academics 
alike have raised concerns about executive pay because of executive compensation steady 
increase.116 However, is in this particular era, when the trend of transparency started playing 
an important role in the development of executive compensation. The 1993 amendments in-
tention was adjust the disclosure requirements to the new forms of compensation (long-term 
compensation), the increased shareholder activism and as a response of the negative public 
perception regarding executive pay.117 The disclosure of corporate compensation through nar-
rative descriptions allowed companies to provide obscured information in order to minimize 
outrage. Thus, SEC’s goal of clear and concise disclosure118, generated a framework where 
executive pay was more visible bis-a-bis other executives, boards and the general market. 
 
o 2000; 
 
Executive compensation peaked in 2000 and decreased during 2001, due mainly to the poor 
performance of the stock market.119 Afterwards, the scandals of many once-proud America 
corporations, including not only ENRON, but also WorldCom, Qwest, Global Crossing, 
HealthSouth, Cendant, Rite-Aid, Lucent, Xerox, Tyco International, Adelphia, Fannie Mae, 
Freddie Mac, and Arthur Andersen120 
 
2001 Corporate scandals and the Sorbanes-Oxley Act 
The collapse of those iconic companies and the shape of the accounting and corporate atroci-
ties, meant also a collapse of the corporate governance structure. Particularly, in the context 
of executive compensation, some outrages exposed the many flaws of corporate governance 
structures. Just before filing bankruptcy, Enron allowed a small number of executives to 
withdraw millions of dollars from their deferred compensation accounts.121 The US Congress 
reaction came just after. In 2002, US Congress passed the Sorbanes-Oxley Act (“SOX”), as a 
																																																								
115	See	SEC	-	Executive	Compensation	and	Related	Person	Disclosure	(https://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2006/33-
8732a.pdf)	
116	Urska	V,	supra	note	ii	at	627	
117	See	Patrick	J.	Straka.	Executive	Compensation	Disclosure:	e	SEC's	A	empt	to	Facilitate	Market	Forces	at	806	
118	Idem.	at	816	
119	Sean	M.	Donahue,	supra	note	vi	at	64	
120	See	Kevin	J.	Murphy.	Executive	Compensation:	Where	We	Are,	and	How	We	Got	There	at	92	
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response to, among other things, executive’s ability to reap large financial awards and later 
modifying financial statements.122 In particular, Section 304 of said Act provides that if a re-
statement is required as a consequence of executive misconduct, the CEO and CFO will have 
to pay back to the company any bonuses, other incentive-based or equity-based pay, and/or 
trading profits realized in the twelve months after the incorrect financial information disclo-
sure.123 As of to day, this provision was added by the Dodd Frank act as we discuss in the 
following chapters. 
 
2006 disclosure reforms 
In August 2006, the SEC amended the executive compensation disclosure rules. The 1992 
rules required significant changes in order to improve transparency required investors and the 
market.124 The leader of this movement was Chairman Christopher Cox. He argued that the 
increased transparency would pressure directors to keep executive compensation under a 
“reasonable” standard.125 The new rules provided a broader tabular disclosure while simulta-
neously improving narrative disclosure.126 In other words, the new rules included a single 
number rule that accounts all compensation for each of the top executives, as well as im-
proved disclosure rules on retirement payouts, perquisites, director’s pay, and related-party 
transactions. 
 
2008 Crisis and the Financial Institutions Executive’s role 
 
The Dodd-Frank Act, the legislative reaction to the 2008 financial crisis, addressed the flaws 
of executive compensation with a strengthened disclosure approach. In 2008, some years after 
the corporate scandals, the financial crisis hit the US. The global impact of the failure of some 
of the prominent Financial Institutions threw the spotlight again on the US corporate regula-
tion. Again, executive compensation was on the spotlight of commentators, academics and 
regulators. The pressure of shareholders, unions, the public, and the media elevated disputes 
about executive pay to national prominence. Some authors argue that companies seemed to 
give higher rewards to executives that were exposing their companies to higher risks. As a 
result, some argue, that those higher risks generated large losses once the mortgage crisis 
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stroke, like in the case of Goldman Sachs that we will discuss in the following chapters. In 
short, excessive-risk management was threating and at the end triggered the financial crisis, 
which had global effects.127 US Congress reaction to the financial crisis, was the enactment of 
the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, which President Obama 
signed into law in August 2010. 128  The Dodd-Frank Act included five sections (§951-§955) 
addressing executive compensation regulation. Through its provisions, the Dodd-Frank Act 
affects the governance of issuers regarding executive compensation by imposing higher 
standards of disclosure, the say-on-pay rule, additional listing requirements, and pay-ratio 
disclosure.129 In the following chapters we will work all sections in a more detailed approach. 
After the Dodd-Frank Act enactment, the SEC has taken action to address and adopt all of the 
mandatory rulemaking provisions of it. 
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II. Structure of executive compensation in USA 
 
“… Human beings … seek information concerning what activities are rewarded, and 
then seek to do (or at least pretend to do) those things, often to the virtual exclusion of 
activities rewarded.”  
 
Steven Kerr, On the Folly of Rewarding A, while hoping for B, p.1 
• Role of incentive orientated compensation 
 
To begin with, generally, compensation is the way of rewarding an employee for its service. 
Furthermore, compensation could also be an input to encourage behaviors and performance. 
Likewise, executive compensation means the reward that a high officer in a company will 
obtain. Executive compensation differs from the compensation of a normal employee because 
of the importance of their role, the noticeable contribution of the CEO to corporate value 
among many other factors that make an executive valuable. Therefore, the compensation of 
an executive will be higher than the one of a normal employee. While vested as an officer of 
the corporation, the main goal of an executive is to maximize shareholder value. Being that 
the responsibilities and objectives of an executive are high, an executive is normally awarded 
with a compensation package that includes several components to attract, engage, motivate or 
incentivize, and retain them.130 Firstly, since compensation is the primary reason why execu-
tives choose to join or leave a company, the contract must provide enough value to induce the 
executive to accept and remain in the position being offered.131 In other words, the contract 
must provide benefits whose value meets or exceeds the value of the other opportunities 
available to the candidate. Secondly, compensation arrangements design should provide man-
agers with enough incentives to increase shareholder value. Again, the objective is to induce 
the executive to focus on shareholder interests and avoid self-serving choices is important.132 
On the whole, an executive compensation package could be designed to reinforce and commit 
the executive to align the company’s performance to meet certain expected goals.133 Coupling 
performance with compensation may require the company to generate tailored compensation 
packages that reward executives pursuing the company financial objectives. However, linking 
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compensation to performance may require a company to increase an executive’s compensa-
tion because compensation that is sensitive to performance is less valuable to managers than 
fixed pay with the same expected value.134 Lucien Babchuk and Jessy Fred argue that manag-
ers, like most people, are generally risk-averse, meaning that they value a certain payment 
more rather than performance-based payment because the last depends on an expectation. 135  
 
• Structure – how is executive compensation authorized 
 
The Board of directors is in charge of aligning the agency relationship between shareholders 
and managers. Therefore, U.S. corporate governance system gives boards substantial power 
and counts on them to monitor and supervise the companies’ managers.136Like any other 
transaction with the corporation, the board must properly authorize the executive employment 
contract.137 In the case of the shares of a stock-based compensation, the articles of incorpora-
tion need to consider that provision.138 Moreover, the Board needs to approve any transaction 
involving company’s stock, such as options or stock grants.139 Customized articles of incorpo-
ration could also include provisions limiting the dilution of shareholders, due to the exercise 
of options, to shareholder approval.140 Henceforth, the process of compensation authorization 
could vary depending on the plan an the articles of incorporation, but the key stone is that the 
Board is in charge of the reviewing, voting and approving executive pay. It is common for 
public corporations that the board delegates the task of reviewing and approving executive 
pay to a compensation committee composed primarily of independent directors.141 However, 
the compensation package is prepared and designed by the Human Resources Department, 
who very often require an external compensation consultant advise them and the compensa-
tion committee.142 
 
The purpose of the compensation committee with independent directors is to create an ar-
mored compensation decision process, aiming on business judgment deference.143 Executive 
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compensation is not subject to fairness review, as long as, informed, disinterested, and inde-
pendent directors approve it.144 Given these points, in the following chapters we will discuss 
the judicial review of executive compensation decisions. 
 
In the book Pay for Performance, Lucien Bebchuk and Jessy Fried argue that the executive 
pay decision is biased by the influence of the CEO who is trying to get the best deal for his 
personal benefit. In fact, their criticism to the structure of executive compensation authoriza-
tion dispute the official theory of executive compensation, which assumes that the board bar-
gains at arm’s length with executives, solely with the interests of the corporation and its 
shareholders in mind.145 Hence, recognition of managers’ influence over their own pay is 
helpful in order to eliminate “generous” compensation packages and align this agency prob-
lem.146 Directors have had several incitements to back up or allow compensation arrange-
ments that favor managers. First, executive’s power to influence board’s decision relies 
among other things on; (i) the pay setting process; (ii) directors’ desire to be reelected; (iii) 
CEO’s power to benefit directors not only by directors pay process; (iv) general social and 
psychological factors; (v) CEO inherent authority; and (vi) the low risk and low costs of 
granting generous payments. Second, board’s information regarding the package could be 
biased. Managers gain of their influence over the information production process, whether at 
the human resource level, subordinates of the CEO, or through the compensation consultants, 
hired through human resources department, and who might be willing to be hired for other 
assignments. Furthermore, Bebchuk and Fried, argue that market forces (competition, market 
for corporate control or proxy contest, managerial labor markets) are unlikely to force limita-
tions on managerial pay and overall they allow deviations from an arm’s length contract-
ing.147 
 
• Executive Compensation – Variables affecting the decision process  
 
According to Larry Comp and Steve Smith, there are four major variables that influence ex-
ecutive compensation levels.148 The role of the executive, meaning the responsibilities and 
duties, are being considered in order to achieve the right pay level. Also, the company size is 
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being measured for the design of the compensation package. Similarly, industry of the com-
pany plays a role, as well as, location, which is not always a very important and measurable 
variable because many public companies are now global companies. 
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III. Levels 
• Relationship between Power and Pay 
o Economic determinants 
 
The supply and demand for executives, a very scarce labor force, creates constraints on what-
ever agreements directors and managers are willing to make.149 However, the fear of a hostile 
takeover or proxy contest should compel executives and directors to craft pay arrangements 
that maximize shareholder value and generate the right inputs to circumvent agency problems 
as well as retain directors. In the free market, generous pay and executive idleness will pro-
duce a market disadvantage.150 Henceforth, it is very important for a company to have a well-
constructed compensation plan to create the right incentives for the manager to lead the busi-
ness aiming the expected financial results. Notably, managers should not be incentivized to 
take high risks to obtain such financial objectives.  
 
o Forms of Executive Compensation 
 
Compensation packages could be tailored in many different ways, thus harness all possible 
rewarding forms. Generally speaking, we will divide executive pay forms in three direct 
forms, salaries and bonuses, Stock plans and Pension Plans.151 Among the several forms to 
pick while crafting a compensation plan the following forms of compensation are some of the 
most common used. 152 Besides, all the factors to consider when picking a reward form, the 
compensation committee needs to consider the advantages and disadvantages of the form to 
the corporation, its shareholders and in relation with alignment of the incentives, as well as 
the tax burden of said form. It is remarkable that in the US, federal intervention prohibited 
companies to grant executives with corporate loans.153 
 
§ Salaries and bonuses 
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Compensation plans include normally a salary component combined with bonus for perfor-
mance. Base salaries for CEOs are typically determined through competitive “benchmarking,” 
based primarily on general industry salary surveys, and supplemented by detailed analyses of 
selected industry or market peers. Size is traditionally measured using company revenues, 
although market capitalization is increasingly used.154 A performance award or long-term 
incentive plan to pay out over multiple years can be linked to a number of measures.155 De-
spite the linkage with performance, incentive plans are criticized because they (i) do not pro-
vide executives with a true ownership stake, and (ii) it is sometimes difficult to establish ac-
curate long-term goals. In addition, there are also cash based long-term plans that have some 
tax advantages, like the Executive 162 “stay” bonus, which has the virtue of incentivizing 
executive retention.156 
§ Stock Plans – Options 
 
Equity based compensation means compensation based on the value of company stock. Re-
stricted Stock is a plan where shares of stock are granted to the executive and the vesting will 
depend on the accomplishment of certain conditions. The advantage of restricted stock is that 
executives could turn into owners, thus aligning their interests with that of the owners. It also 
encourages retention, since an executive would be foregoing the value if they left prior to the 
end of the restriction period. However, a disadvantage of restricted stock is that it dilutes ex-
isting shareholders by issuing additional shares for which no purchase price was paid and out-
side of share price they lack a pay-for-performance relationship. 157 Likewise, Stock options 
consist of a plan that grants an executive the right to purchase a fixed number of shares of 
company stock at a fixed price over a specified period of time. One advantage of utilizing 
stock options is that the design of these plans can be very flexible. One of the disadvantages is 
that options are taxed when exercised, so there is no tax deferral, as such, the executive will 
need to pay for the shares plus the tax. Another disadvantage is that options encourage risky 
executive behavior in an effort to drive stock prices up with little regard for the downside. 
Options are very advantageous for managers because they give the holder the right, but not 
the duty, to buy an underlying asset by a certain date at a fixed price.158 In the case of execu-
tive compensation, the underlying assets are normally shares of the company. To put it anoth-
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er way, options give the right to the executive to buy certain number of company shares for a 
specific price “spot price”. Therefore, if the value of the shares drops below the spot price, the 
executive can walk away without any consequence. As a result, options allow managers to 
obtain profits without being exposed to risk of losing money. Also, options do not have a 
linkage to performance besides of the movements in share price. Another form of compensa-
tion, which is very flexible, is the phantom stock. This kind of equity-based plan can be de-
signed to mirror the value of equity-based plans without the complications of using real equi-
ty.159 Another equity based plan that mirrors equity are the Nonqualified Stock Alternative 
Plan, which has also some tax advantages. There is another performance-based and/or time-
based compensation that has been widely used, restricted stock. The key is that restricted 
stock does not create biased incentives the way options do. Restricted stock is a plan where an 
executive is granted shares of stock that are subject to forfeiture unless certain conditions are 
met.160 On this side, restricted stock has advantages. First, if the restrictions have been met 
then the executive turns into an owner, thus minimizing the agency problem between share-
holders and managers. Second, it also motivates retention because the executive would leave 
some money in the table if leaving. On the other side, the disadvantages of restricted stock are 
that it dilutes existing shareholders and that time based shares lack of the connection with 
performance. 
 
§ Pension Plans 
 
Many compensation contracts promise executives a substantial stream of benefits after re-
tirement.161 The most common reward to encourage retention is the insertion of a pension 
plan in the compensation agreement. In the design of the average employer compensation 
plan, companies usually use “qualified” pension plans because of the favorable tax treatment 
that they receive (beneficial deduction for the company and when employers retire the pen-
sion funds they get taxed.162 On the opposite, companies prefer to award executives with a 
non- qualified “supplemental” executive retirement pensions (known as “SERPs”) because 
this plans allow to shift some of the executive’s tax burden to the firm. Also, SERPs benefit 
executives in the way that they are defined benefit plans, which guarantee fixed payments to 
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the executive for life, rather than linked to the contributions made by the employee.163 In ad-
dition, to the compensation plan, retired executives are sometimes subject to a consulting con-
tract that offers them an annual fee for being available for advising the new manager.164 
o Reward types  
 
A compensation plan might include several ways of rewarding a manager for its service. As 
mentioned above, the purpose of a compensation package is to attract, engage, motivate or 
incentivize, and retain them. Despite the forms for achieving said purpose, in this section we 
will discuss some types of rewards that are different to the normal compensation plan that 
rewards an executive during the tenure of the position, described above. In particular this kind 
of rewards should be divided into two categories, the first as golden hellos, the second golden 
bye-bye. Golden hellos, are a large initial payment on top of the annual compensation pack-
age or the executives pay agreement. 165 The justification is that golden hi are necessary to 
attract star CEOs, who are reluctant to forfeit the substantial income they expect to earn in 
their current positions. Similarly, a golden bye-bye, is being used when the executive is leav-
ing the company. This departure payments are not mandated under the CEO’s contract at the 
time he or she decides (or is asked) to leave.166 These gratuitous payments have often been 
made when the executive is fired, when the company is being acquired or in some cases when 
they retire. The objective of these additional payments is to sweeten executive’s departure. 
All together all this forms of executive payment are being used in the design of compensation 
packages to incentivize executives to obtain the performance awaited for the company. In 
addition provide the right stimulus to attract, engage, motivate or incentivize, and retain the 
executive. 
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IV. Legal framework of executive Compensation - USA 
 
• US Legal framework – Federal Regulation 
 
The US federal regulation regarding executive compensation can be catalogued as a disclo-
sure-transparency legal framework. Since the early 1978, when the Securities Exchange 
Commission implemented the tabular form disclosure, federal action in the field of executive 
compensation has promoted a stricter disclosure regime. The ground for that reasoning is that 
disclosure helps investor and the general market taking informed decision. In this section, we 
will focus on the most recent regulation over compensation, the Dodd Frank Act and its sev-
eral sections which have been implemented by the SEC.  
 
Section 951 – Institutional Investment manager’s vote’s disclosure 
 
On October of 2010 the SEC implemented rules requiring institutional investment mangers to 
report their votes on executive compensation and "golden parachute" arrangements at least 
annually, unless the votes are otherwise required to be reported publicly by SEC rules.167 The 
purpose of these rules is to make proxy and information statements, reports and registration 
statements easier to understand. Also, provide investors with a clearer and more complete 
picture of the compensation earned by a company’s principal executive officer, principal fi-
nancial officer and highest paid executive officers and members of its board of directors. The 
rules are in fact intended to provide better information about key financial relationships 
among companies and their executive officers, directors, significant shareholders and their 
respective immediate family members.168  
 
Section 951 – Say on Pay 
 
Some months after the Institutional Investment disclosure provisions, in January of 2011 the 
SEC implemented the Say-on-Pay rules. Section 951, say on pay rules require shareholder 
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approval of executive compensation and of "golden parachutes".169 This rule requires that 
‘‘[n]ot less frequently than once every three years, a proxy or consent or authorization for an 
annual or other meeting of the shareholders for which the proxy solicitation rules of the 
Commission require compensation disclosure shall include a separate resolution subject to 
shareholder vote to approve the compensation of executives,’’ (a ‘‘say-on-pay vote’’)170. Al-
so, the rule allows companies to customize the timing of the say-on-pay votes. Through a 
non-binding vote shareholder will determine weather say-on-pay votes will be required to 
happen every one, two or three years. Say-on-Pay provides shareholders with a mechanism to 
influence executive pay. This tool provides shareholders with the opportunity to evaluate a 
firm’s publicly disclosed practices to provide direct feedback to boards of directors through a 
non-binding shareholder vote.171 
 
However, some authors have criticized say on pay because companies will tend to suit their 
compensation agreements in anticipation of potentially unfavorable proxy recommendation 
from proxy advisors. The reason is that proxy advisor recommendations might significantly 
affect shareholder-voting decisions.172 In other words, companies suit their compensation 
agreements prior the annual meeting in order to obtain a favorable recommendation from the 
proxy advisor. Henceforth, Board’s knowledge of the variables measured by proxy advisors 
and the way of arranging those variables to fulfill proxy advisors expectations is a tool to cir-
cumvent say-on-pay. 
 
Section 952 – Stricter listing Standards 
 
The SEC implemented rules and added section 10C to the Securities Exchange Act 1934 in 
January 2013. These rules prohibit exchanges to list any equity, which is not in compliance 
and take into account the proper authority of the compensation committee, the independence 
of the members of the compensation committee, and the consideration and the independence 
of compensation advisers. In relation with to compensation committees listing standards, 
companies are required to address173: (i) the independence of the members on a compensation 
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committee;  (ii) the committee’s funding and authority to retain compensation advisers; (iii) 
the committee’s consideration of the independence of any compensation advisers; and (iv) the 
committee’s responsibility for the appointment, compensation and oversight of the work of 
any compensation adviser. Regarding compensation consultants, the SEC requires issuers to 
disclose any conflict of interest that they might have with the issuer. Finally, the rules also 
take into consideration some exceptions to the listing requirements. 
 
This rules aim is to detach CEO influence over the compensation process in public compa-
nies. As pointed out by many scholars, in particular by Lucien Bebchuk and Jessy Fried, CEO 
tend to have enough power to bend the process in order to obtain the most beneficial compen-
sation arrangement at the expense of shareholder value. In our opinion, enhancing the stand-
ards of the compensation committee, as well as constraining the ability to hire compensation 
consultants will be favorable for the agency relationship, between executives and sharehold-
ers, and overall for the market. 
 
Section 953 – Pay Ratio Disclosure 
 
In October 2015 the SEC implemented the so-called “Pay Ratio Disclosure” final rule. This 
statutory mandate requires companies to disclose the ratio of the compensation of the CEO in 
relation to the median compensation of it employees. This transparency effort is aimed to 
provide investors and the public with information regarding the overall pay practices in a par-
ticular company and among them. In particular, Pay Ratio rules require companies to dis-
close: (A) the median of the annual total compensation of all their employees; (B) the annual 
total compensation of the company; and (C) the ratio of the amount in (B) to the amount in 
(A), presented as a ratio. Companies will bear the burden of applying metrics and gathering 
the information to disclose the pay ratio every three years. Companies could exclude from 
their pay ratio metrics, non-US employees from countries with data privacy laws or regula-
tions that prohibit said disclosure.174 
 
Section 955 – Hedging disclosure (proposal) 
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The SEC proposed rules that build up the disclosure of company’s hedging policies applicable 
to executives and employees. In this proposal, companies will have to disclose their policies 
in proxy and information statements for the election of directors The company, its parent, its 
subsidiaries and any subsidiary of any parent of the company will fall under the umbrella of 
the hedging disclosure regulation. .175 
 
In my opinion, this hedging disclosure rule could be understood and is in fact inside trading 
regulation. Albeit, transparency standards over the investment behavior of executives and 
employees over the equity of the company and its whole structure, might prevent unwanted 
conducts pursuing to lower the risk of any equity based compensation. As a result, this disclo-
sure rule will promote that an executive receiving equity compensation will have the same 
risk exposure as any shareholder. However, the results of this rule might not be the ones ex-
pected because it is an annual disclosure. The timing constraints will not provide interactive 
information to the market, thus limiting market response to a risk-hedging conduct. 
 
Section 953 – Pay for performance disclosure (proposal) 
 
One of the most progressive regulations proposed by the SEC is the pay for performance dis-
closure released in April 2015. This proposal will encourage companies to disclose the rela-
tionship between executive compensation and the company financial performance. In other 
words, it will make clear and transparent the link between compensation and performance. 
The metric, performance to compensation, will result in the total shareholder return (TSR).176 
The TSR will provide quick and simple information regarding the company expenditure on 
executive compensation, as well as facilitating a comparison of TSR among peer companies 
and companies in the same industry. Moreover, companies will be required to disclose the 
TSR for the last five years. 
 
This simple rule will encourage standardized payments among companies in the industry. 
Hence, compensation designers will be encouraged to use more performance-based compen-
sation. At the same time, it might generate an unfair compensation threshold for the executive 
when negotiating its compensation. The board executive compensation decision will need to 
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be linked and in accordance with the compensation received by the executives of their com-
petitors. Then again transparent performance related compensation will create investors and 
public reactions over the TSR. 
 
Section 954 – Recovery of Executive Compensation (proposal) 
 
The last SEC proposal (July, 2015) aiming to implement the Dodd-Frank act provisions is the 
rule regarding recovery of executive compensation. The rule will encourage Securities Ex-
changes to implement listing standards inquiring companies to adopt and comply with a re-
covery policy.177 The clawback requirement will instruct companies to include policies that 
will force executives to pay back any incentive-based that they were awarded by error. That 
is, if there is any accounting restatement or correction of a material error, the executives will 
have to return the compensation that they received due to the error. This rule will apply to 
current and former executives that received incentive-based compensation for the three fiscal 
years preceding. Finally if a company does not adopt the rules, they will be subject of delist-
ing. 
 
o States Regulation 
 
In addition to the legal requisites of the authorization process contained in the MBCA and the 
Del GCL, states regulation is mostly shaped through the judicial decisions. Payment to direc-
tors looks like a self-dealing transaction (conflicting interest), but Delaware courts are reluc-
tant to look at compensation with higher scrutiny. Therefore, the rule making in executive 
compensation cases is blurred and a business judgment standard applies.  
 
§ Cases  
 
In Re the Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. Shareholder Litigation (2011 WL 4826104 (Del. Ch. 
Oct. 2011)178 
 
																																																								
177	See	SEC	release	-	SEC	Proposes	Rules	Requiring	Companies	to	Adopt	Clawback	Policies	on	Executive	Compensation		
178	See	In	re	Goldman	Sachs	Group,	Inc.	Shareholder	Litig.,	2011	Del.	Ch.	LEXIS	151	(Del.	Ch.	Oct.	12,	2011)	
	 35	
An investor lawsuit claiming that Goldman Sachs employees compensation plan encouraged 
high -risk taking, which resulted in several losses after the financial crisis. The argument goes 
on by arguing that the business strategy was not in the best interest of the stockholders be-
cause the ones benefiting the most was the management. Goldman Sachs had an Auditing 
Committee and hedged positions in order to balance risk. The court ruled that Goldman 
Sachs’ decisions were product of a business judgment rule.179 Regarding the bath faith claim 
approval of compensation scheme, the court ruled that “the decision as how much compensa-
tion is appropriate to retain and incentivize employees, both individual and in the aggregate, is 
a core function of a board of directors exercising its business judgment.”  Under those cir-
cumstances, plaintiff pleadings were short in creating a reasonable doubt that a business 
judgment was in place.180 Moreover, the plaintiff also alleged that the Board was uninformed 
when making the compensation decision - gross negligence standard (provision included in 
Defendants articles). The allegations suggested that there were metrics that were not consid-
ered while deciding the compensation package. Once again, the court ruled against plaintiff 
because the board was informed. Again, as long as the Board is reasonably informed, the ade-
quacy of the information cannot constitute a claim. The Plaintiff also alleged waste. Hence, 
compensation levels where contended on the basis that they were egregious or irrational due 
to the allocation of risk. Correspondingly, the court argued that any rule would deter corporate 
boards from the optimal rational acceptance of risk and then again covered under the umbrella 
f the business judgment rule.181 
 
In sum, Delaware law “provides corporate directors and officers with broad discretion to act 
as they find appropriate in the conduct of corporate affairs” and “in the exercise of their busi-
ness judgment on behalf of the corporation.” 
 
Lewis v. Vogelstein (699 A.2d 327 Del. Ch. 1997)182 
 
Lewis is a compensation case where the Board of Directors breached the duty of loyalty and 
granted themselves a generous stock option plan. Even though, this is a case conflicting direc-
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tors compensation, rather than executives, the rule of Law is applicable to executive compen-
sation cases.  
 
In 1996, Mattel, Inc. (Mattel) adopted a compensation plan for the company’s directors in-
cluding an option grant. The plan was then presented to the company’s shareholders at the 
annual meeting for a vote and it obtained shareholder approval. Harry Lewis brought suit and 
argued that the directors had violated the duty of loyalty because the option grants represented 
self-dealing and thus had to be proven entirely fair to the corporation. Delaware standard of 
review has two possibilities if shareholders approve the compensation. The first is that direc-
tors don’t have a right to reasonable compensation for ordinary services, but for extraordinary 
services. In the US directors approve their own pay. However, stock options are subject to 
shareholder vote. If shareholders approved the option plan Delaware courts review the fiduci-
ary duty breach under two standards. First, a waste standard because compensation is gov-
erned only by waste, but appears to have a higher standard to meet than normal waste. And 
second, fairness standard (places burden on plaintiffs to show unfairness):  compensation 
must be fair. In this case the Court found that the stock options were sufficiently unusual that 
they might be considered corporate waste.  
 
In re the Walt Disney Company Derivative Litigation (2005 WL 2056651 Del. Ch. 2005)183 
 
Eisner (Disney President) hired Michael Ovitz after past CEO died. When he was hired the 
compensation plan considered low risk and high return for the CEO. The argument was that 
Ovitz was a superstar. The package was designed in a manner that if company financial re-
sults were favorable then payment was going to increase and if the company performance was 
lower than expected then the CEO was provided with an exit package. In other words, the 
compensation package inputs were not properly aligned to provide incentives for perfor-
mance. After thirteen months, Ovitz and Eisner relationship did not interlock, but Eisner 
could not find a legitimate basis for firing Ovitz for grossly negligence or malfeasance (thus 
avoiding the exit package). Plaintiffs claim Disney board breached their fiduciary duties to act 
with due care and in good faith by allowing Ovitz to be fired without cause, establishing and 
then triggering a massive golden parachute. Informally, Eisner hired Ovitz, though the com-
pensation committee approved the contract. The court ruled that the directors did not breach 
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their fiduciary duties. Directors were reasonably informed in order to meet the requirements 
of the duty of care. The court analyzes three possibilities for duty of good faith. First, subjec-
tive bad faith, meaning fiduciary conduct motivated by actual intent to do harm. Second, lack 
of due care, where fiduciary action taken solely by reason of gross negligence and without 
any malevolent intent. Lack of due care was rejected because duty of due care and good faith 
are separate and distinct duties. And third, intentional dereliction of duty, a conscious disre-
gard for one's responsibilities; an intent-based standard. In sum, the court held that the direc-
tors have to be ‘reasonably informed’ in order to meet the duty of care requirements. In the 
light of the above-mentioned cases and generally courts have been consistent in giving greater 
deference to board decisions over executive compensation if done under the business judg-
ment rule. 184 Hence, if they relied on advice by outside experts and if nominally independent 
and informed directors approve the arrangement, their decision receives the business judg-
ment protection. 185 
 
Calma v. Templeton (Del. Ch. 2015)186 
 
In this derivative action brought against Citrix Systems, Inc. by a shareholder, Calma, who 
challenged non-employee director’s Restricted Stock Units awards for being excessive. Plain-
tiff claimed breach of fiduciary duty and waste. Whereas the Court found that the directors 
breached the fiduciary duty, reviewed under fairness standard, because (i) the compensation 
committee was not disinterested, and (ii) the company did not obtained shareholder approval 
of any specific package to be paid to the non-employee directors, despite shareholders ap-
proval over the Company's 2005 Equity Incentive Plan. Moreover, the Court did not find that 
the compensation constituted waste, because did not impose realistic limits on the award’s 
maximum, rather than it was an unjustly enrichment in excess of peer companies. 
• Shareholder action – Litigation 
Shareholder action could possibly be a mechanism to limit “generous” executive compensa-
tion arrangements. However, as shown in the case mentioned above, courts tendency is to 
give consideration to board decisions made under business judgment rule. Executive compen-
sation would not be reviewed under fairness standard, if informed, disinterested, and inde-
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pendent directors approved the package.187 Fairness will then be met with (i) a compensation 
committee composed of independent directors which is a requisite for public companies; (ii) 
directors of the compensation committee review the information prepared by the compensa-
tion consultant on the package to be awarded; and (iii) disinterested independent directors 
deciding the package, which is some sense implied with the independence of the directors and 
reinforced by Section 952 of the Dodd-Frank Act. As a result, the presumption, that courts 
support executive compensation decisions made under a business judgment rule, is to date 
reaffirmed.  Back in 2004, Bebchuk and Fried, argued that courts generally defer to boards’ 
decisions on compensations issues  if those decisions were made under the eyes of the busi-
ness judgment rule. 188 They also argued that if the process requirements were satisfied, the 
courts would generally refuse to consider arguments that the approved package was unreason-
able.189 
The litigation process190, in particular regarding executive compensation, is based on the chal-
lenge of a plaintiff to the board on the argument that the directors breached the fiduciary duty 
to shareholders. First, the Board satisfies the factual requirement if the decision was made by 
independent and well informed directors. Accordingly, to meet the informed requirement, 
directors need to review or listen to presentation from an inside or outside expert. Again, if 
independent and informed directors have taken a decision over the compensation package, the 
business judgment rule presumption is met. Second, regarding the procedural requirements, 
the suit ought to be brought as a derivative litigation, where shareholders require the company 
to take action. As a result, the derivative demand requirement implies that the board will need 
to investigate and address the problems before the lawsuit. Board can either pursue the litiga-
tion or argue that demand was not made. As a result of the latter the board can usually have 
the case dismissed.191With this in mind, in order for the plaintiff to bring action against the 
Board, futility of demand needs to be proven. Futility requires plaintiff to present particular-
ized facts arguing against the independence and disinterest of the directors, hence the plaintiff 
needs to dig over information that might not be accessible.192 If futility is proven, then the 
claim goes to the court or the Board has the option to appoint a special litigation committee 
who will decide in the best interest of the firm. In sum, the merits of the claim will have to go 
through a complex litigation process, where the plaintiff does not have in many cases a rea-
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sonable amount of information. Moreover, if the board was cautious enough and the compen-
sation decision was taken under the business judgment protection the courts will mostly defer 
to the Board. Finally, there are two ways to challenge the business judgment presumption, the 
waste standard and the bad faith standard. First, the waste standard means that the compensa-
tion package passed was so irrational that no reasonable person could have approved it.193 
Second, bad faith standard means that directors “consciously disregard” their duties during 
the approval of the compensation package.194 
To summarize, shareholder litigation is a complex mechanism that presents several procedural 
obstacles. Hence boards will try to secure compensation decisions by implementing as many 
corporate governance measures as required. One example is board ratification of compensa-
tion packages, after approval by an independent, disinterested and informed compensation 
committee. With this in mind, it is remarkable that the courts approach to executive compen-
sation has been parallel to the requirements imposed by the federal authorities. Accordingly, 
the SEC requirement of independence has been also a requirement observed by the courts. 
Nevertheless, the SEC has approached courts factual requirements (informed directors, as 
well as the waste and bad faith standard) in a different manner. The Commission has used 
transparency mechanisms to address their concerns about the financial reasoning and motives 
behind the approval of a compensation package. Transparency has had the purpose of provid-
ing shareholders and the public with information to allow them to judge and in some way dis-
cipline the board with either decline or increase the share value of the company. Equally, the 
SEC has in some way helped shareholder litigation by encouraging disclosure of information. 
That pool of information could provide shareholder action with elements to strengthen a com-
pensation case. 
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Conclusion 
 
Since the early 1930s, executive compensation has certainly obtained a lot of attention from 
the public and from regulators. Back then, executive compensation was a topic among aca-
demics, media, legislators and shareholders. Executive compensation throughout the 20th and 
the 21st centuries has encountered a rough public environment, triggered by “generous” pay-
ments running against shareholder value creation, flaws in compensation arrangements and 
the creation of harmful incentives. The federal government approach has been a result of pub-
lic pressure, economic crisis or corporate scandals. Hence, the federal government’s interven-
tion on executive compensation has been, since 1933 with the Securities Exchange Act, 
through disclosure and, since 2002 with the SOX, through instrumentation of independence 
standards. The most recent example was the Dodd Frank Act that came out after the financial 
crisis of 2008, which included a broad range of disclosure mechanisms intended to regulate 
executive compensation. In other words, the agency problems between the CEO, board of 
directors and shareholders regarding executive compensation, ought to be disciplined with 
independence mechanisms and transparency. Accordingly, in relation with executive compen-
sation, the purpose of this research is to answer questions about the appropriateness of gov-
ernmental intervention; disclosure approach and its effects; and adequateness of disclosure 
and independence standards. 
There is something certain about federal government intervention; it has calmed down the 
pressure of the press, society, market and shareholders. However, there is no certainty on 
whether it was the right thing to do or not because there are no measures to prove it right and 
corporate scandals and financial crisis, that occurred after regulation was enforced, have ex-
posed flaws in executive pay. Correspondingly, managerial compensation design and plans 
are changing continuously in order to find the best way of incentivizing executives to obtain 
positive financial performance. Accordingly, corporate governance structures have to run par-
allel to this moving target in order to find the best control structures to solve the agency prob-
lem between executive pay and shareholder value. Under those circumstances, it is appropri-
ate to think that the best way for the federal government to approach this issue is with auto 
regulation of the market participants, particularly inside companies. Whereas executive com-
pensation ought to be evolving continuously and on a case-by-case basis in order to adjust to 
any particular setting and be able to allow the most suitable pay arrangements, government 
intervention should be constrained to broadly discourage behaviors that are generally consid-
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ered to affect the agency relationship. Then again, the reason for legislative action to not con-
strain companies’ design of pay arrangements is to give them a broad range of opportunities 
to incentivize their executives and leave them with the privilege to decide and include the 
economic factors and pay forms that will allow them to find the best compensation plan to 
meet their financial goals. For this reason, legislative action should only be taken in limited 
areas, which are: (i) self-dealing, (ii) manager’s power to secure rents, (iii) outrage and (iv) 
the creation of bad incentives. With the purpose of shifting and managing the agency relation-
ship of executive pay. In conclusion, US government transparency standards, allows a dia-
logue between market participants to discipline the development of compensation designs, 
which means a market self-regulatory approach. 
 
Whether or not information access as implemented by the SEC after the Dodd Frank Act, will 
be useful to align managerial compensation practices departing from shareholder value crea-
tion is still a question that remains open. Until now, the federal government disclosure ap-
proach has tried to align compensation windfalls and unwanted behaviors, by providing the 
market with accurate and precise information. In my opinion, SEC’s implementation of the 
different sections of the Dodd Frank Act, as described in chapter III, is intended to adjust 
market participants’ perspectives and acceptance of compensation plans. Disclosure of com-
pensation data might create the following: (i) market surveillance on compensation and its 
linkage with performance; (ii) reputation effects towards directors and executives; (iii) share 
value adjustment, due to flaws on compensation; and (iv) compensation arrangements that 
will consider in a broader way society’s perception. As mentioned above, disclosure allows 
self-regulation of the market. First, an increase in market surveillance and scrutiny might en-
courage adequate performance-based compensation and it is intended to make directors deci-
sions transparent, thus decisions over the compensation plan tend to be dependent on share-
holder perspective and expectations. Board will take into account shareholder perspective on 
executive compensation plans to link them to performance. In this sense, the proposed pay for 
performance rule, will be a useful tool for market participants to scrutinize the efficiency and 
results of compensation plans and will make them accountable. Second, both CEO and 
Boards will be more exposed to a reputation effect. When generous compensation plans are 
approved, the market perspective of the CEO will be as an abusive executive and the Board as 
indulgent or ineffective agent of shareholders. Third, market forces could adjust share value if 
there is an evident outrage in compensation plans. This affects in two ways. On the one hand, 
it affects the general company market perception shifting share value down. On the other 
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hand, it affects managers compensation linking it to share value. And fourth, generous com-
pensation plans, might affect societies perception of payments that are not linked to perfor-
mance and that are above the average employee payment. Societies perception is driven by 
“moral”, “fairness-based” or “populist” perspectives opposing large amounts of pay. Pay ratio 
disclosure metrics will unwrap information in just a number that compares one to one, execu-
tive and the median employee compensation. That rule is aimed to provide clear-cut infor-
mation that could trigger several press releases and criticisms of the perceived high salaries. 
Society will evaluate if a compensation plan is fair and if it is morally acceptable. Questions 
over the real value of the executive compensation might arise, as well as questions over the 
real value of the median employee salary. Dodd Frank’s Act’s information access implica-
tions could be broader, because it could potentially increase the number of participants and 
their influence over the executive compensation decision process. Pay Ratio will provide clear 
information that empowers social demands regarding pay arrangements in general. Hence, 
exacerbating the moral and social discussion of excessive compensation. Again, executive 
compensation has been viewed since its early stages (in the 1930s) as excessive. Therefore, 
Pay Ratio will likely trigger a discussion over the compensation policies inside the company 
and that discussion will develop over a very subjective ground. Therefore, social and labor 
pressure might trigger some biased modifications to employee pay structures within the com-
panies. At the same time, not only public pressure over compensation packages will come 
more into play, but also other market participants’ influence, due to the information disclosed. 
Similarly, Pay for Performance will allow a clear and quick comparison between performance 
and pay. This data will generate an intrinsic discussion between executives and their board of 
directors on why or why not is the comparison made correctly or if there are some factors not 
considered or over evaluated. On the one side, the performance metric will be based on a peer 
company comparison where general industry share price movements should be avoided. Thus, 
executives will try to promote those movements as a result of companies good performance if 
they are beneficial to them. The result will be a discretionary and vague decision on how a 
manager influenced company’s performance trying to eliminate positive or negative outside 
shocks. On the other side, peer companies will have a clear vis-a-vis visibility and compensa-
tion will have to follow the trends among peers. The downside of this peer group comparison 
is that industry share value movements will tend to drive compensation amounts up or down 
without having any linkage to performance. Also, an overall critisism is that finding the ap-
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propriate peer group could be influenced by executives’ power (Calma v. Templeton 2015)195. 
Compensation packages are being ranked in compensation indexes196(where compensation 
amounts are being compared among peer groups, market capitalization and against many oth-
er metrics) and if they appear outrageous that will certainly be in the spotlight of the press and 
the public.197As a result, society will scrutinize not only the amount of payments and compen-
sation policies of the companies, but also its linkage to performance and its justification. 
Moreover, increased information will allow the scrutiny to extend beyond the compensation 
package justification, up to analyze if amounts were fair and reasonable. Also, general market 
trends and over exaggeration of these or of any other metrics will be closely reviewed. In 
general disclosure is intended to provide the public with the required data to discuss any com-
pensation package or policy in a very broad perspective, which implies that shareholders will 
have more information to sustain any suits against compensation packages. As a result, share-
holders will have more elements to prove waste or bad faith in any derivative suit. 
 
Whether disclosure and independence measures have been so far enough is a question that 
needs to take executive compensation as a constantly evolving corporate governance topic. 
There is no way of measuring the degree on how stricter regulation could have influenced 
executive compensation. In some way, some measures that were considered as strict, did not 
affect the market as expected. One clear example is the SOX enhanced requirement of a com-
pensation committee composed of independent directors which was supposed to deter the 
amount of companies being listed and at the end it did not affect. Federal government has 
until now favored a free market development approach of compensation policies and packag-
es, as well as and a free package design approach. Even though broadly recognized “bad prac-
tices” have been regulated in order to limit harmful behaviors, like inside trading or conflicts 
of interest in the compensation decision process, the playground for companies to craft and 
decide the compensation package that suits their own needs and expectations is encouraged to 
remain as unrestricted as possible. Albeit, crisis and scandals have exposed gaps in compensa-
tion regulation, enhanced disclosure rules have filled the loopholes. Disclosure is easy for 
government to require and makes market participants accountable and knowledgeable of the 
potential risks and behaviors inside the company. However, disclosure shifts costs to market 
participants because the company is required to gather information that in many cases is not 
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easily obtained or not routinely collected. It also allows shareholders and the public to super-
vise and scrutinize pay plans. Hence, transparency enables government to disengage regulato-
ry action from compensation practices favoring a free market approach over pay plans with 
disclosure requirements.  
 
In general, since compensation is the way of providing executives with the right incentives to 
drive companies performance, I believe that recent executive compensation disclosure re-
forms will be effective to the extent that market participants supervise and scrutinize execu-
tive pay decisions and pay decision process. There is no doubt that market participants have 
the right incentives to supervise and scrutinize. Hence, market participants’ perceptions and 
their opinion will enable self-alignment and self-discipline of the whole compensation deci-
sion process. Transparency could certainly be beneficial as long as it gves rise to efficient and 
adequate compensation packages. In other words, more information and a intensified scrutiny 
could potentially trigger efficient and satisfactory compensation arrangements. Furthermore, 
independence standards are the best mechanism to reduce conflict of interest and inside trad-
ing in the company, as well as being the best Board’s watch dog. 
 
Going forward, there are several risks and difficulties that need to be overcome. In general, I 
agree with US disclosure and independent directors approach. However, recent reforms might 
result in new challenges. First, Pay ratio disclosure has a stockholder approach, which brings 
into the agency relationship of compensation practices a new participant. Despite the effort of 
providing investors with overall compensation practices information, it allows society to 
evaluate compensation policies under fairness and moral perspectives. I believe that the eval-
uation will be subject to various subjective standards, and in some way will erode general 
compensation practices in order to align all parties’ incentives. Making society a participant 
could be a risky movement because the agency problem between shareholders and managers 
will have to include society perspective into an already biased equation. Moreover, the pres-
sure that companies might receive from the press and the society could put again shareholder 
value creation aside. A good example that shows another way society might evaluate compen-
sation occurred in the aftermath of the “Deepwater Horizon” oil spill. Transocean Ltd., 
awarded large bonuses to their executives owing to a great year of safety performance the 
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same year that the “Deepwater Horizon” oil rig exploded and collapsed causing a massive oil 
spill.198 
Transocean compensation package exemplifies the social influence over compensation. In 
that case some could argue that the compensation arrangement was excessive and did not take 
into account the overall damage that the spill created. Others could consider executives en-
deavor on managing the situation and their performance along the unfortunate event in the 
Gulf of Mexico. Second, Pay for Performance disclosure creates incentives for directors to 
participate in the most favorable peer group. Despite the benefit of having a number that 
shows the linkage between compensation and performance, it is still problematic that execu-
tives could try to adapt the metrics (industry or performance) in order for their company to be 
in the most favorable peer group. Again, allowing them to receive higher compensation. In 
this case, the press linked safety performance standards with compensation practices. Some 
could argue excessive compensation, while others could argue that executives were rewarded 
for their performance after the critical event. Again, society influence on executive compensa-
tion might bring to the game subjective standards in order to measure the adequateness of any 
compensation package. Third, I believe that the new regulation did not consider that in order 
to obtain the expected results of any information disclosure requirement should be without 
time constraints and on an interactive basis. For example, annual disclosure of any kind does 
not allow a proper and direct market reaction, which will be limited to happen just after the 
disclosure. Also, before the disclosure several factors could have been considered in order to 
minimize any negative impact. Having an interactive disclosure, like for example between 
pay and performance will allow companies performance to be directly reflected in share val-
ue. However, the cost of interactive information is high and it distracts executives from their 
own tasks. Moreover, it might produce incentives to focus on short-term investments on the 
cost of any long-term investment. I believe that further disclosures mechanisms need to take 
this more into account in order to allow market incentives to be more powerful. Fourth, there 
are concerns that pay for performance encourages risky behaviors. This came up after some 
incidents related with the financial sector where managers where exposed as incurring in con-
duct that resulted in losses to their company. One good example is the JP Morgan London 
Whale case, where the Chief Investment Office (CIO) excessive risk positions in derivatives 
turned against the bank and resulted in huge losses. As stated in the Permanent Subcommittee 
on Investigations report on the case “Incentive-based compensation systems … factors that 
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influence individuals’ performance and conduct is financial reward.”199 The CIO traders were 
among the employees receiving the highest pay of the bank. Even though not on an executive 
level, the role that compensation’s incentives played should be considered because in some 
way risk taking and how the losses were hidden. Regardless of the clawback of almost two 
years of compensation of the involved employees, the case raises the question on the extent 
that performance based compensation can encourage risk taking. Finally, considering today’s 
institutional investors power that contradicts the Berle-Means dispersed ownership model, 
their participation is very important to supervise and scrutinize companies’ compensation 
policies and the link to performance. Also, the role of proxy advisors in the implementation of 
the regulation, like the say on pay, will be very important. Under those circumstances, further 
regulation and the development of the new rules on executive compensation will depend high-
ly on their behavior, so not only companies will be under in spotlight, also these other market 
participants. 
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C. Comparative section 
It could be fair to suppose that executive compensation should not differ much between coun-
tries, at the end the same objectives and incentives should be encouraged in pubic companies 
of the both countries. However, the disparities between Germany and the US regarding execu-
tive compensation contravene said argument. This part of our joint research paper will point 
out the differences between Germany and US in the managerial compensation process and 
legal framework. 
 
I. Introduction 
It is important to acknowledge that corporate governance is organized in a very different way 
among countries. For example, some agency problems could be present in some jurisdictions 
and in others not. The case of executive compensation is a good example to frame such dif-
ferences. In this part we will discuss the differences that exist between Germany and the US 
on the managerial pay approach, rather than describing the inherent structures of each country 
(like in the first sections). Despite the ownership model differences, where Germany has a 
“core”200 shareholder model in contrast to US dispersed ownership model, there are few as-
pects of executive compensation that are similar both in Germany and the US. It is important 
to keep in mind the recent reforms on executive compensation that both countries’ have re-
cently implemented (Germany – AktG and Us - Dodd Frank Act), which have shaped the ex-
ecutive compensation regulatory structure of both countries. Moreover, we will approach the 
topic that has obtain the most press attention, which is the disparities regarding managerial 
remuneration between Germany and the US. The differences are huge, whereas in US execu-
tives are being paid much more than their peers in Germany. There might be many reasons for 
such a big difference in the amount of executive compensation but this will not be the main 
subject of this paper. In this comparative section we focus on the differences between the 
German and the US approach to executive compensation in order to accentuate the structures 
that work the best for each country, rather than evaluating the assertiveness of approach. In 
other words, the focus of this section is on the differences and similarities amid legal frame-
works of executive compensation and its authorization process.  
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1. Legal framework of executive compensation 
One major part when talking about executive compensation is the applicable legal framework 
to each country. First of all both, Germany and the US, have a totally different legal system.  
 
In Germany there is a code based law system where in the US there is a common law system. 
As described above German regulation concerning executive compensation can be found in 
the Aktiengesetz. The Aktiengesetz is the main source of legal framework for executive com-
pensation in Germany.  
 
In the US the situation is a bit different. There are several participants in the legal equation. 
One participant is the US congress who is in charge of enacting and amending securities laws. 
Another participant is the Securities Exchange Commission (in following referred to as SEC), 
which is an agency of the federal government and whose responsibility is the implementation 
and enforcing of securities laws. For example, the SEC is in charge of implementing the sec-
tions Dodd Frank Act. They implemented rules over various topics that in detail are subject to 
another part of this paper. When having a look when these rules where passed one can see that 
as well in Germany as in the US a lot has changed in the aftermath of the financial crisis. 
Having an agency with supervisor and enforcing powers over securities laws is big difference 
between Germany and the US. In contrast Germany does not have an agency with similar 
powers and whose task it is to not only supervise that the current rules and laws are being 
obeyed but to implement and substantiate the provisions that are contained in federal law. The 
result is that without an agency properly empowered to implement laws you might have open-
ended laws as the VorstAG, whereas in the US all of these provisions would be defined total-
ly into detail.201 Especially provisions concerning sustainability and the usual pay would most 
likely be defined.202  
 
Another participant in the US legal system are state courts and laws. Companies ought to be 
incorporated in any state and they could have their business operation in another part of the 
US. As a result, many US companies are incorporated in Delaware where corporate law and 
corporate courts are at the forefront of the corporate legal development. Under those circum-
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stances, if any conflict arises, state courts will solve the dispute and they create precedent. 
Henceforth, courts can shift the way companies approach executive compensation because 
they will try to obtain business judgment deference. This is in fact one big difference between 
Germany and the US, because state courts have the power to erode the ground and incentivize 
companies to engage in corporate modifications that affect the executive compensation pro-
cess. Yet, courts and federal government intervention have developed parallel without inter-
fering between each other. In Germany there is only one the legislative power who is able to 
modify the legal framework. In general, there are core differences between Germany and US 
regulation. In contrast to German regulation, the US legal framework is able to adapt and re-
adjust in an expedite manner in order to cover different cases and failures regarding executive 
compensation, that is through the SEC rulemaking process or through the State Courts when 
ruling over a particular case. However, the SEC has a limited authority to update or create 
rules and courts are constrained to create law on a case-by-case basis. Accordingly, executive 
compensation rules in the US ought to be found in different legal bodies, in contrast with 
Germany corporate governance code or AktG.  
 
The Dodd Frank Act is a good example of SEC’s limited authority to create laws. German 
government has been quick to adopt the VorstAG shortly after the financial crisis as a product 
somehow caused by public outrage and pressure about excessive executive compensation.203 
It was a fast reaction of the German lawmaker. In the US such a fast and innovative new law 
seems rather unrealistic.204  
 
And this leads us straight to the second point where differences between Germany and the US 
arise. This difference does not deal with the authority enacting the rules, rather about the cat-
egory of the rules. Generally speaking in the US rules and regulations can be described as a 
disclosure-independence legal framework. In Germany it is not easy to put the regulatory 
framework into a category but the approach is to encourage the development of the stock cor-
poration. In other words, in Germany maximizing profits for investors has typically not been 
a prevailing priority. 205 Instead, German approach has been to strike a balance between vari-
ous participants connected with companies and the main concern has been long-term sustain-
																																																								
203	Fleischer, 2009 NZG, 801, 801 (2009). 
204	Mathieu, 38. Brook. J. Int’L L., 580, 652 (2013). 
205	Brian	R.	CHeffins.	The	Metamorphosis	of	"Germany	Inc.":	The	Case	of	Executive	Pay	at	4	
	 50	
able growth. 206 Of course there are also provisions in the Aktiengesetz that deal with the top-
ic of disclosure and transparency, but they can be seen as a supporting tool to achieve the 
main point of the legislator, which is to keep the stock corporation development on a long-
term basis.  
 
Deciding if one system is better than another is a different task. Of course every way of ap-
proaching the legal framework of executive compensation has its positive and its negative 
points. One can state in favor of the US way that it is a flexible on. Meaning that the SEC is 
able to react in a rather short time upon new developments. The SEC, despite the limitations, 
does not need to wait for the federal legislator to pass new laws, they can simply issue a new 
set of rules to encourage or discourage governance practices in the field of executive compen-
sation. In favor of the German legal framework legal expectancies are clear for every partici-
pant of the market from the beginning on what is meant with the new laws. There is no need 
to wait for an agency to implement the provisions included in a federal law to know what will 
be its impact on their business. This offers some kind of security to every market participant 
and the ability to trust on the written law. But the flexibility of the SEC costs its price to com-
panies. They are being confronted with a whole set of rules that could change continuously. 
The fact that the law is not defined into detail in Germany does not mean that stock corpora-
tions here do not use the terms provided by the law to define them. They just do it by them-
selves in order to work with them.207 This can be described as some kind of self-reflection, 
which also may bring out good results concerning executive compensation systems.  
 
As a result of the immense differences in the legal systems and therefore the legal background 
for executive compensation it is very difficult to decide whether one system is better than the 
other. It is simply not possible but maybe a few better ideas can be taken away from the Ger-
man system. In fact, it leaves market participants with a bit more freedom and space for their 
own idea but the end the result is still regulated. Whereas in the US the disclosure approach 
encourages market participants to dialogue among themselves in order to find the most suita-
ble compensation packages that will benefit their business. The best way to say it would be, 
that maybe both countries could still learn a few things on how to approach the topic from 
each other.   
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2. Authorization process 
There is no doubt that the purpose of executive compensation in Germany and the US is to 
encourage managers to have a positive performance. Also, in both countries share the exist-
ence of an agency problem. In spite of the common economic determinants and the similar 
agency problems, executive compensation authorization differs between Germany and the 
US.  
 
The general structure of managers’ pay is in some way the same, in both countries; the gov-
erning body of the corporation has to approve compensation packages. However, in the US 
the board of directors can delegate the power to compensation committee who will be in 
charge of that task. Some years ago, the supervisory board was able to delegate such powers 
to a compensation committee but [now] not anymore. This is an important difference because 
US approach is to have compensation package decisions as independent as possible, in con-
trast to Germany where compensation packages design constrained by an employee “reasona-
ble” component due to the employee representatives’ in the supervisory board.  
 
A very distinctive difference between executive compensation regulation in Germany and in 
the US, are the benchmarks or standards that German companies have to follow in order to 
grant a compensation package. Consequently, we can label this approach as a regulatory ap-
proach because the compensation plan will be shaped in such a way that it is in accordance to 
such standards (linked to performance, in balance with industry peer group, equitable to aver-
age employee and allowing sustainable development of the company). In reality, the US is 
also trying to approach those issues rather than with strict ruling like the German case, with 
through disclosure. Pay for Performance is similar to performance-linked compensation and 
in balance with industry peer group and Pay Ratio is similar to equitable to average employee. 
The only German benchmark, which has not been addressed in the US through disclosure 
requirements, is the one regarding sustainable development, which contains a long-term per-
spective element. In general, German regulatory approach in contrast to US disclosure ap-
proach has created strong limits to the design of compensation, rather than allowing market 
participants to design the most favorable compensation package that meets their goals and 
needs.  
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In neither of both legal systems, shareholders have an influential role. Shareholder vote is 
required in both countries when equity or options are being granted, due to the dilution of 
shareholder ownership. Recently, both countries have enacted rules concerning say-on-pay 
which allows shareholder to either favor or reject a compensation plan proposal.  
In Germany these rules consist of a non-binding shareholder vote, there are no information 
concerning in which yearly basis this should be held. In the US these rules are only a little bit 
more explicit. The provision there states that a say on pay vote is supposed to be held once in 
a three year time span. But all these rules do not change the situation that shareholders in both 
legal systems do not have a lot to say.  
 
Some authors have argued that Germany is in a transition towards an American capitalist 
model triggered from global companies, as well as from the European Union (EU) 208. How-
ever, the evidence shows that the German approach will rather be directed to a long-term sta-
ble and continuous growth approach. 
  
																																																								
208	Brian	p.	8	
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3. Executive compensation going forward 
The way we see further developments regarding executive compensation and trends in that 
field vary between countries. The reason for that is the way both countries will approach so-
cial perception of executive compensation both in Germany and in the US. Each country has 
considered public opinion into the compensation decision process. Hence, society is allowed 
to be a participant in the agency problem, could have power to bargain and include their inter-
est into the game of executive compensation.  
 
The game of executive compensation is already crowded with various parties that are trying to 
align their interest, but the society should not be forgotten when talking about it. Of course 
the people do not directly interfere with the design process of executive compensation pack-
ages, but they do create pressure upon the legislator. Just take the Occupy Movement as an 
example. In Washington they have protested heavily against the executive compensation prac-
tice and what a practice of injustice it is.209 
 
 In Germany the main protest against executive compensation practice took place right after 
the crisis. People felt like the whole system of executive compensation was unfair. In reaction 
to the crisis the German government passed the VorAG. Though, such law aim was not only 
to set up new rules concerning executive compensation, but also to give people the perception 
that something was being done.210  Hence, it is arguable that executive compensation cannot 
be actively influenced by the society but in some extent societies could also play a role over 
the decision process and the amounts. In fact, this adds up another participant into the already 
complex scenery. There are already a lot of participants (shareholders, directors, CEO and 
other executives) trying influence the executive compensation package. As a result, the recent 
regulation over executive compensation will initially complicate the decision process, but will 
allow a better stakeholder scrutiny.  
 
In the US there have been examples of public interference in executive compensation deci-
sions. With the rule regarding pay ratio disclosure, public perception will come into play, due 
to the impact that the ratio will have over the society. Again, the public will have clear-cut 
information of the disparity, thus a “moral” or fairness judgment of the society could follow 
																																																								
209	Mathieu, 38. Brook. J. Int’L L., 580, 652 (2013).	
210	Fleischer, 2009 NZG, 801, 801 (2009). 
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and shape compensation policies. Having said that, it is possible that in the US executive 
payment decision process will have to start taking into account the society perspective. In the 
case of Germany, society participation has been somehow the rule. 
II. Conclusion 
In conclusion, there are several differences between the Germany and the US approach to-
wards the regulation and the decision process of executive compensation. Hence, those differ-
ences arise because in each country different sets of factors apply. Moreover, the differences 
have shaped executive compensation through out its history, not only regarding the amounts, 
but also regarding the structures used in order for the companies in each country to have the 
best package to adequately align the incentives. In other words, corporate mechanisms of the 
two countries do not run in the same direction, the particular legal, society and economic con-
text generate divergences between the US and the German approaches regarding executive 
compensation. It is remarkably that the purpose of executive compensation ought to be the 
same in both countries. Nevertheless the agency problem has been regulated in a different 
way because legislators have privileged some incentives among others. On the one side, the 
US legislator has promoted so far a shareholder supremacy approach through disclosure and 
independence mechanisms. On the other side the German legislator approached this topic 
with a different set of rules and regulations. First of all it seems pretty much like in the US 
that executive compensation and its difficulties are being challenged with rules and regula-
tions. But when having a closer look at those regulatory actions one can see the differences. 
For example the provisions in the Aktiengesetz concerning the framework for executive com-
pensation are much more vague than they would ever be in the US. Plus there are not actual 
court rulings concerning those rather new benchmarks for executive compensation such as 
sustainability. This is something that could not be found in the US. This puts a way heavier 
burden upon the supervisory board to develop a good and sustainable remuneration package 
that complies with the laws. Another factor that needs to be taken into account when talking 
about the legal framework in Germany is codetermination. The cornerstone of German corpo-
rate law is codetermination, especially in the supervisory board, which is in charge of the re-
muneration package. So the view of the view of those representing the workers, which are 
those who have a stake in the company, is being taken into consideration and account when it 
comes to executive compensation. In conclusion the differences between the German and US 
regulatory approach over executive compensation are remarkable and have potentially created 
divergences between the developments of executive compensation in both countries, on the 
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one side Germany, with stronger social influenced rules and on the other side US with more 
free market approach. As a result, it is plausible to infer that the regulatory approach taken by 
each country has shaped executive compensation in different ways creating a different legal 
framework, a different decision process and finally could possibly have triggered a different 
economic shame. The different economic shame motivated in some extent by the different 
legislative approach could have been a reason for creating divergences of amounts granted. 
However at this point of time, the future of executive compensation seems to be going in the 
same direction. The recent Pay Ratio Rule in the US has a fair wage component, allows us to 
presuppose that despite the differences in regulatory approach, Germany and the US are rul-
ing executive compensation in a similar way – a stakeholder direction. 
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